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Summary
The bargaining power of children has long been neglected in the literature since children
have been considered as public or private goods for their parents. Given that they do
not enter households by choice and generally bring little to household resources, children
could be the most vulnerable to intrahousehold inequality although they may beneﬁt from
parental altruism. Recent collective household consumption models help recover the shar-
ing rules of children using observation of some exclusive, privately-assigned expenditure
and distribution factors. The sharing rules of children can then be used to analyze their
monetary poverty. As well-being is multidimensional, it is also imperative to look at de-
privations in other dimensions including health, nutrition, education and living standards.
From a policy perspective as well, the role of social protection in aﬀecting children's deci-
sions and well-being is worth researching since understanding the responses to a program
in terms of those outcomes provides comprehensive impacts on deprivations in needs and
capabilities. The Dissertation in general looks at these issues in its three essays (papers).
In the ﬁrst essay, Children's Resources and Poverty in Single-mother and Male-
headed Households, we estimate a collective complete demand system model to recover
children's resource shares and analyze their poverty. Identiﬁcation of the sharing rule
between children and adults relies on private assignable goods and distribution factors.
Resource shares are used to compute poverty measures of incidence, depth and sever-
ity. These intrahousehold inequality-robust rates are also compared with those based on
equal resource sharing (household level). Based on Ethiopian LSMS-ISA data for two
sub-samples of families with children (married male-headed and single female-headed), it
ﬁnds inequalities in intrahousehold resource allocation and welfare. In particular, we ﬁnd
that children command less household resources and are poorer than adults which worsen
with the number of children. Resource allocation is aﬀected by parental diﬀerences in ed-
ucation and age, child education, proportions of female children and women, and number
of non-biological children. Single-mothers not only are more altruistic to their children,
they also avoid higher child poverty than married male heads although this seems to dis-
appear when the number of children increases. Unlike the general belief that poor children
live only with poor adults and households, our estimates show that non-poor families also
host poor children. Further, traditional poverty measures, which ignore intrahousehold
resource allocation, are found to understate child (and adult) poverty. Lastly, regional and
rural-urban disparities exist. Findings have implications for fertility, gender, targeting and
spatial redistribution issues.
The second essay, Children's Multidimensional Deprivation, Monetary Poverty
and Undernutrition, analyzes children's well-being in terms of multidimensional de-
List of Figures
privation, monetary poverty and undernutrition. After identifying children as poor using
their resource shares, it also extends a version of the traditional multidimensional child
deprivation index to include a monetary dimension. We also look at the overlaps be-
tween the three alternative measures of child well-being: monetary, undernutrition and
multidimensional. For instance, we ask: Are all monetarily non-poor children also not
undernourished? Do non-poor households host stunted children? What portion of chil-
dren identiﬁed monetarily-poor is also multidimensionally-deprived? Using the 2013/14
Ethiopian LSMS data, we ﬁnd that multidimensional child deprivation is high and diﬀers
with demography and geography. The probability of falling into multidimensional depri-
vation and the average intensity of it almost monotonically increase with the number of
children. Indices for urban children jump in values when a monetary indicator is included.
Although stunted and multidimensionally-deprived children concentrate more at the lower
household/child income levels, there is also evidence that the monetarily non-poor still
host deprived children. Depending on the type of poverty measure, 10 percent to a quarter
of monetarily non-poor children are deprived multidimensionally. We ﬁnd no evidence sug-
gesting that children's nutrition is related to either child- or household-level expenditure.
In particular, about 60 percent of expenditure-poor under-7 children and 46 percent living
in expenditure-poor households are not found to be nutrition-deprived. And about two-
thirds of stunted children are not found in the poorest 20% or 40% of children/households.
Evidences question the use of only monetary information in targeting children.
Lastly, in Impacts of Social Protection Programs on Children's Resources and
Well-being, we evaluate the separate and joint impacts of Ethiopia's Productive Safety
Net Program (PSNP) and allied transfers on children's bargaining power and well-being.
PSNP is Africa's second largest social protection program with public works (PW) and
direct support (DS) components. While estimated resources and shares from a collective
demand system proxy bargaining power, we measure child well-being by resource-based
monetary poverty, undernutrition and multidimensional deprivation. Inverse-probability-
weighted regression adjustment, which also controls for other correlates of outcome vari-
ables including previous participation, provides the average treatment eﬀect on the treated
with alternative speciﬁcations, disaggregations and traditional propensity score matching
methods used for checking robustness. Using LSMS-ISA data from Ethiopia Socioeco-
nomic Survey 2013/14, we ﬁnd that PSNP and joint PNSP-allied transfers slightly reduce
relative resource shares of children. Allied programs, in contrast, increase resource shares
of boys. Impacts on child monetary poverty are mixed and directly follow from eﬀects on
sharing rules: when a program positively aﬀects child resource shares, it decreases child
poverty and vice versa. Accordingly, child poverty is worse with PSNP and its joint with
allied transfers, but better with allied transfers alone. Household-level poverty is not af-
fected except by DS which reduces it only after a previous participation is controlled. PW
(only for under-seven children) and allied programs desirably impact child multidimen-
sional deprivation. We also ﬁnd that stunting among under-seven children is worse with
PW (especially for boys). In lending support to previous evidence that when women re-
ceive exogenous transfers, child outcomes improve, we ﬁnd that children in single-mother
families participating in PW program better of in terms of resources, poverty and nutrition
compared to those in in male-headed families. The undesirable impacts may require revis-
ing these on-going social protection schemes to a cash plus form such as by incorporating
parental awareness on child nutrition and education.

1. Children’s Resources and Poverty
in Single-mother and Male-headed
Households*
1.1. Introduction
Considering the household as a black box, the unitary model assumes that choices
of all household members, including children, are proxied by a single preference of
the household head. This, besides violating the microeconomics teachings of indi-
vidual consumer theory, hides a member's welfare loss or gain due to any inequality
in intrahousehold resource allocation. However, there is substantial evidence that
rejects this model and underlines the role of intrahousehold resource allocation since
the early 90's (e.g., Thomas, 1990; Schultz, 1990; Bourguignon et al., 1993; Brown-
ing et al., 1994). Very importantly, ignoring this intrahousehold resource allocation
leads to a considerable understatement of the level of poverty in developing countries
(Haddad and Kanbur, 1990; Dunbar et al., 2013; Bargain et al., 2014).
Unlike the neoclassical model, the collective household model argues that household
choices are grounded on individual member preferences. In seminal contributions,
Chiappori (1988, 1992) contends that the key to unlock the black box is the sharing
rule with which the family allocates available resources across its members. When
such a rule exists, eﬃciency of the collective decision process is implied and exoge-
nous bargaining process within the household is captured. One can thus consider
intrahousehold inequality in resource allocation and make individual welfare analy-
ses.
Consequently, there has been an increased interest, both in academic and global
policy fronts, to measure resource shares and welfare of household members including
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children. Academia continues documenting inequality in intrahousehold resource
allocation (Bourguignon et al., 1993; Browning et al., 1994; Lise and Seitz, 2011;
Dunbar et al., 2013; Bargain et al., 2014; Mangiavacchi et al., 2018). Globally,
Commission on Global Poverty recently recommended the World Bank to compute
poverty rates at women, children and young adults levels. However, until the seminal
article of Bourguignon (1999), children had no bargaining power and were considered
as public or private goods for their parents. As they do not enter households by
choice and generally bring little to household resources, children could be the most
vulnerable to intrahousehold inequality (Dunbar et al., 2013). On the other hand,
they may beneﬁt from parental altruism (Bhalotra, 2004) especially from mothers.
Yet, only few empirical evidence is available from developing countries on resource
shares and welfare of children allowing them to bargain with adults in a collective
framework. And the existing scant evidence is mixed. Dunbar et al. (2013) and
Bargain et al. (2014) apply almost similar collective consumption models, though
with diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategies, on data from Malawi and Cote d'Ivoire re-
spectively. Very recently, the methodologies in these studies are applied using data
from two more sub-African countries: Bose-duker (2018) in Ghana and Bargain
et al. (2018) in South Africa. All, except Bose-duker (2018), ﬁnd that child resource
shares are lower than adults and vary by family size and structure, and that con-
ventional poverty measures understate the incidence of child poverty. In contrast,
Mangiavacchi et al. (2013), ﬁtting a complete collective demand system model, doc-
ument children enjoying higher resource shares than adult females but traditional
poverty indices slightly overstating child poverty in Albania. This goes in line with
the ﬁndings of Bose-duker (2018) for Ghana.1 The current study aims to contribute
to this debate by estimating the sharing rule of children from a complete collective
demand system and analyzing their poverty status using data from Ethiopia.
One source of debate in the collective consumption model literature is identiﬁcation
of the sharing rule. As almost all surveys collect consumption data at household
level, the issue is on how one can recover from household level consumption data
information about individual members. While some of the recommended structural
models are highly restrictive (e.g., consumption of purely private and private goods)
1In fact, the issue of overstatement or understatement of child poverty across authors and methods
needs to be examined cautiously since that depends on the assumption made on children's needs.
Child poverty line is lower with lower needs so that poverty is lower. Thank you Olivier Bargain
for raising this issue.
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and easy to estimate resource shares such as Chiappori (1992), others are liberal but
diﬃcult such as Browning et al. (2006). Yet, others propose models at the middle
that are only a little restrictive and easy to estimate from Engel curves (Lewbel and
Pendakur, 2008; Dunbar et al., 2013). A crucial identifying restriction, for example,
is that resource shares are independent of total household expenditure which Menon
et al. (2012) and Bargain et al. (2018) empirically validate it.
In this study, we use a similar restriction but follow the estimation procedures of a
collective Almost Ideal Demand System model as in Menon et al. (2017) and Man-
giavacchi et al. (2013, 2018) to recover the resource sharing rules of children and
adults. The demand system consists of four commodity groups: food and bever-
ages, clothing, utilities and energy, and other non-durable goods. The sharing rule
is allowed to depend on individual observed assignable expenditures and distribution
factors where the former are scaled by a function that captures the within-household
resource transfer. Private assignable expenditures are found from assignable cloth-
ing and footwear, education, certain personal care items, and other adult goods
(alcohol, tobacco, chat/Khat). In addition to the traditional distribution factors in
the literature (parental diﬀerences in education and age), we use as distribution fac-
tors other variables pertinent to children (if all children attend school, proportions
female children and women, and number of non-biological children).
Our empirical exercise uses data from the 2013/14 wave of the Ethiopia Socioeco-
nomic Survey (ESS), conducted as part of the LSMS-ISA project by the World Bank
and Ethiopia's Central Statistical Agency (CSA). Missing prices are also obtained
from prices surveys of the CSA. We choose a sample of families with children, com-
posed of two sub-samples (two-parent male-headed and single-parent female-headed
families). Ethiopia is an interesting case study for our issue it is one of the poorest
countries in the world with a sizable child population, over 52% according the lat-
est census. Oﬃcial adult-equivalent-based child poverty incidence (32.4%) is higher
than that at the household level (29.6%) (MoFED, 2012; CSA et al., 2015). Mul-
tidimensional poverty incidence is also among the highest in the world (87%) and
human development index remains one of the least (0.396). These are despite the
government pursuing various anti-poverty and `transformation' strategies over the
past couple of decades and the economy growing fast, for instance at 8% in per-
capita terms over the period 20042014 (World Bank, 2016). Moreover, the ESS
provides many household and individual consumption and other details which we
11
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exploit for implementing our theoretical framework.
Once children's resource shares are estimated and analyzed, we use them to compute
poverty measures of incidence, depth and severity. These intrahousehold inequality-
robust rates are then compared with those based on equal resource sharing (house-
hold level). A needs-based national poverty line is preferred to dollar/day thresholds.
We also test the hypotheses by Haddad and Kanbur (1990) that poverty depth and
severity measures which ignore intrahousehold resource allocation understate the
level of poverty and that the fate of the headcount ratio is an empirical matter. In
addition, we aim to provide some evidence on the gender and family structure as-
pects of intrahousehold resource allocation as we estimate child resource shares and
poverty indices for married male-headed and single female-headed families. As a
further beneﬁt of the new method to child poverty estimation using resource shares,
we look at the overlap between the poverty of children, adults and the household.
What proportion of poor children live with non-poor adults? What portion of poor
children live in non-poor households? Do these diﬀer when the head is a female? We
also provide some evidence on the overlap between child undernutrition and mone-
tary poverty at child, adult and household levels. We lastly answer the question of
how our estimates vary with the number of children and over space.
Our results generally conﬁrm inequalities in intrahousehold resource allocation and
poverty which vary with number of children, family structure and space. The al-
location is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by parental diﬀerences in education and age, child
education, proportions of female children and women and number of non-biological
children. In particular, older mothers assign more resources to children. Children's
expenditure shares are also higher if they are all in school and when there are more
girls relative to boys. We ﬁnd that children have lower expenditure shares (16% or
30%) than adults (23% or 32%) depending on family type (male-headed or single-
mother). Monetarily, these correspond to monthly non-durable per-child outlays of
ETB 339 or 433 and per-adult outlays of ETB 491 or 457 in male-headed or single-
mother families respectively. Consistent with Bargain et al. (2014), results show
that single-mothers are more altruistic to children than male-heads.
Using resource shares to estimate poverty incidence, depth and severity measures,
we ﬁnd that children are poorer than adults which also vary with family type and
space. In a sample of families with children, prevalence of child poverty increases
from 65% when there is only one child to 93% when families host more than four
12
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children. Single-mothers, besides being more altruistic to their children, host less
poorer children than male-heads. Inline with previous literature and hypotheses by
Haddad and Kanbur (1990), traditional poverty measures, which by construction
ignore intrahousehold resource allocation, are found to understate child (and adult)
poverty compared to those based on resource shares.
Our estimates also show that up to a ﬁfth of non-poor households and adults host
poor children, unlike the general belief that poor children live only with poor adults
and households. Changing the poverty measure to undernourished children also
provides similar conclusion, in particular and consistent with Brown et al. (2017),
that up to a tenth of monetarily non-poor adults or households host stunted children.
Moreover, less portion of poor children live with non-poor adults in female-headed
families than in male-headed ones, in line with our previous evidence that single
mothers in general are more equal to their children than adults in male-headed
families. These overlaps question the eﬀectiveness of using household information
to target children's welfare. Finally, we observe regional and rural-urban disparities
in resource shares and poverty. The remaining part of the ﬁrst essay is organized
as follows. In the next section, we discuss the theoretical framework as well as
empirical and post-estimation issues. After describing the data in the third section,
we present and discuss the results in the fourth section. The last section provides
concluding remarks.
1.2. Theoretical Framework and Estimation Issues
In this section, we provide the theoretical framework with the underlying assump-
tions and identiﬁcation strategies of the sharing rule. This is followed by brief
discussion of empirical issues pertinent to estimation of a collective Almost Ideal
Demand System. Post-estimation matters related to recovering of resource shares
and poverty measurement are also highlighted.
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1.2.1. The Collective Household Consumption Model
Consider a household consisting of adults and children, indexed by k = 1, 2 respec-
tively.2 Private goods could either be assigned to each member, e.g., clothing, or
non-assigned, e.g., food. Represent adults' assignable consumption by c1 and chil-
dren's by c2 and aggregate non-assignable consumption by q so that total household
consumption becomes3 C = c1 + c2 + q.
In a centralized setting, the budget constraint of the collective household is pc1c
1 +
pc2c
2 + pqq = e, where ph , h = c
1, c2, q, are associated prices of assignable and non-
assignable goods and e is total household expenditure. Unlike assignable goods, one
cannot observe individual quantities and prices of non-assignable goods (q1, q2, pq1 , pq2).
Only q(= q1 + q2) and pq are observable.
Preferences of each household member are assumed to be caring type in which the
utility of one member depends on the sub-utility of the other; i.e. for each k = 1, 2
we consider Uk(c1, c2, q1, q2;d) = Uk[u1(c1, q1;d), u2(c2, q2;d)] where d represents
a vector of demographic variables4 that aﬀect preferences of the members directly
so that observed heterogeneity is captured. Note that d = (d1, d2, d12) where d1
and d2 are characteristics speciﬁc to adults and children respectively while d12 are
household-level characteristics. We also assume that utilities uk are continuously
diﬀerentiable as a consequence of which demand functions of each member will
ultimately be smooth.
We assume that household decisions are Pareto-eﬃcient (Chiappori, 1988, 1992).
This alternatively means that family decisions are made in a decentralized fashion in
two stages: (i) Members decide on how to share the total household expenditure e so
that each member receives a sharing rule φk with φk > 0 and e = φ1 +φ2. (ii) Given
the sharing rule φk, each member maximizes her own utility function u
k(ck, qk;d)
2The very scant literature that estimates a collective consumption model with public goods makes
a strong assumption that people in diﬀerent marital status have similar preferences, as done
for singles and married ones by Browning et al. (2013). However, such an assumption fails to
identify the model when children are considered as decision makers, as we do in this paper, and
it is diﬃcult to observe children living alone. Moreover, in our empirical application, the vast
majority of goods are private, for e.g. food and beverages, clothing, and other goods categories
constitute a total share of over 92%.
3Note that if index k = 1, 2 is superscript, it indicates an endogenous variable and if it is subscript,
it is associated with an exogenous variable. Also note that i and j index goods.
4They are also termed preference factors (Bourguignon et al., 2009).
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subject to her individual budget constraint p
′
ck
ck + p
′
cq
k = φk thereby choosing her
optimal (Marshallian) consumptions of assignable goods ĉk = ck(pck , pq, φk,d) and
non-assignable goods q̂k = qk(pck , pq, φk,d).
Household-level (aggregate) Marshallian demand systems of assignable and non-
assignable goods are obtained as
ĉ(pc1 , pc2 , pq, e,d) = c
1(pc1 , pq, φ1,d) + c
2(pc2 , pq, φ2,d)
and
q̂(pc1 , pc2 , pq, e,d) = q
1(pc1 , pq, φ1,d) + q
2(pc2 , pq, φ2,d).
Note that individual-level optimal Marshallian demands are observed as functions
of prices, the sharing rule and demographic attributes. Optimal consumption levels
of the non-assignable goods are only observed at the household level.
1.2.1.1. The Collective Complete Demand System
The demand system model we specify follows from Menon et al. (2017) and Man-
giavacchi et al. (2013, 2018) who extend the QUAIDS of Banks et al. (1997) to the
collective framework and hence named the Collective Quadratic Almost Ideal De-
mand System (CQUAIDS). The model begins with a speciﬁcation of an individual
expenditure function in terms of price aggregators and a demographically-translating
household technology to ultimately get individual Hicksian and Marshallian budget
share demands. The sharing rule is speciﬁed as a function of observed individual
expenditure and a vector of distribution factors. Individual expenditures are also
scaled (Chavas et al., 2017) in a way that guarantees independence of the sharing
rule and total expenditure (Menon et al., 2012). However, we ﬁt a linear version of
the model to our data. For a detailed derivation of the model, see Appendix A.1.
Given continuous and concave price p aggregators taking up the usual functional
forms, lnAk(p) =
1
2
(
α0 +
∑
i
αilnpi +
1
2
∑
i
∑
j
γijlnpilnpj
)
; Bk(p) = β0Π
i
p
βki
i , and
λk(p) =
∑
i
λki pi, additionally assumed to be a diﬀerentiable, homogeneous function
of degree zero of prices.
15
Children's Resources and Poverty in Single-mother and Male-headed Households
The demographically-modiﬁed demand for good i in terms of budget share wi is
aggregated from member demands wki as
wi = αi + ti(d) +
∑
j
γijlnpj + β
1
i [lne
∗
1 − lnA1(p)] + λ1i
[lne∗1 − lnA1(p)]2
B1(p)
+β2i [lne
∗
2 − lnA2(p)] + λ2i
[lne∗2 − lnA2(p)]2
B2(p)
(1.1)
where lne∗1 and lne
∗
2 are modiﬁed logarithmic individual total expenditures from
observed ones (lnek) given by a translating household technology:
lne∗k = lnek −
∑
i
ti(d)lnpi. (1.2)
Demographic augmenting of the demand system helps capture observed heterogene-
ity among households and is done by introducing a translating technology ti(d) so
that demographic attributes d enter additively with expenditures (Lewbel, 1985;
Perali, 2003). They are deﬁned for simplicity as ti(d) =
∑
r
τirdr for r = 1, ...R.
Note that we can estimate, for each good i, income parameters (β1i , β
2
i , λ
1
i and λ
2
i )
at the individual level while the rest at the household level (i.e. intercepts αi, price
parameters γij and demographic scaling eﬀects ti(d)).
1.2.1.2. The Sharing Rule
Until now, we have made an implicit assumption that individual total expenditures
ek are observed. Such information, nonetheless, is barely collected, as is the case
in many household surveys and in the survey we use in this study. As a solution
to this issue, one can exploit expenditures on exclusive or assignable goods p′cc
k
to learn about how much each member receives from total household resources and
then correct for the resulting measurement error (Caiumi and Perali, 2015; Menon
et al., 2017; Mangiavacchi and Piccoli, 2017). Obviously, the lower the proportion
of non-assignable expenditures
p′qq
ek
, the lower will be the measurement error. We
will get back to this correction issue in a moment.
In our case, we have exploited all available expenditure information in the survey if
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some goods are consumed exclusively by adults or children. Expenditures on cloth-
ing, which are collected at male, female, girl and boy levels, as well as on education,
which are collected at each individual level, are clearly assignable expenditures.
Moreover, we make an assumption to regard consumption of the following items
exclusively by adults: alcoholic drinks, stimulants (speciﬁcally, chat and cigarettes)
and certain personal care items. Once assignable individual expenditures are taken
into account, non-assignable expenditures are assumed to be shared equally by adults
and children.5 Hence, one can consider ek =
p′cck
hk
+
p′qq
h
where hk is the number of
persons in adult and children groups and h is household size (Chavas et al., 2017).
Consequently, observed resource shares become σk =
ek∑
ek
k
where σ1 + σ2 = 1, so
that we can write
lnek = σklne. (1.3)
Returning to the awaiting correction issue of ek, a modifying functionm(z) ∈
(
0, e
ek
)
is used to correct any measurement error related to ek which leads to speciﬁcation
of the sharing rule. The arguments of this function are distribution factors z which
aﬀect the intrahousehold bargaining between adults and children but not their pref-
erences.6 The m-function can optionally be thought to capture the magnitude and
direction of transfer of resources from adults to children or vice versa (Menon et al.,
2017): if m < 1, the expenditure transfer goes from member 1 (adult) to member 2
(child) and the direction is reversed if m > 1.
This enables to deﬁne the sharing rule, which explains a shadow intrahousehold
resource allocation, as a function of individual expenditures and distribution factors,
i.e. for member 1 (adult), we have φ1(e1, z) = e1 ·m(z) which in log becomes linear
as7
lnφ1(e1, z) = lne1 + lnm(z) = σ1lne+ lnm(z). (1.4)
5Chavas et al. (2017) test the innocence of such an assumption; they show that assuming a fair
distribution of non-assignable goods among family members does not aﬀect parameter estimates
of the sharing rule (see their Proposition 5 and Appendix B).
6Note that the scaling function does not depend on expenditures, a separability property in line
with the theoretical properties of independence of income of the sharing rule by Dunbar et al.
(2013) and Chavas et al. (2017) and the empirical validation by ?.
7Since φk should not exhaust all household total expenditures e, i.e. φk < e, the m-function is
restricted to stay between 0 and eek .
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Since by deﬁnition lne = lnφ1 + lnφ2 = lne1 + lne2, we have the sharing rule for
member 2 (child) equal to
lnφ2(e2, z) = lne− lnφ1 = σ2lne− lnm(z). (1.5)
The functional form of the scaling function m(z) is assumed to be of Cobb-Douglas
type for empirical purposes so that in log form, it becomes linear as:
lnm(z) =
L∑
l=1
φzllnzl (1.6)
where L is the dimension of distribution factors vector z.
The introduction of the expenditure-scaling function m(z), and consequently the
sharing rule, has the eﬀect of modifying the system speciﬁed in 1.1 into
wi = αi + ti(d) +
∑
j
γijlnpj + β
1
i [lnφ
∗
1 − lnA1(p)] + λ1i
[lnφ∗1 − lnA1(p)]2
B1(p)
+β2i [lnφ
∗
2 − lnA2(p)] + λ2i
[lnφ∗2 − lnA2(p)]2
B2(p)
(1.7)
where, from (1.2), (1.4) and (1.5), lnφ∗1 and lnφ
∗
2 are given by lnφ
∗
1 = σ1lne +
lnm(z) −∑
i
ti(d)lnpi and lnφ
∗
2 = σ2lne − lnm(z) −
∑
i
ti(d)lnpi. In our empirical
application, we ﬁt to our data the linear version the above model where the quadratic
terms λ1i and λ
2
i are not estimated.
1.2.2. Empirical Estimation and Post-estimation Issues
Endogeneity of Total Expenditure
We address endogeneity of total expenditure primarily due to measurement errors by
instrumenting total expenditure using wealth indicators as an instrument.8 However,
8We also note that prices too may potentially be endogenous due, for example, to common
unobserved shifts in preferences aﬀecting both prices and quantities. However, lack of plausible
instruments for a host of prices leads us to assume that they are exogenous. In fact, we are
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wealth may still be mismeasured as a result, for example, of omission or incorrect
valuation of its components. As far as these mismeasurements are independent of
consumption recall errors and if wealth is correlated with true total expenditures,
our proposed instrument remains valid (Dunbar et al., 2013). A control function
procedure is used, which uses as regressors the residuals of an auxiliary regression
of total expenditure on a set of socio-demographic variables and our instrument
into the demand system model (Dauphin et al., 2011; Mukasa, 2015; Mangiavacchi
et al., 2018). The procedure is executed in two steps: the log of total expenditure
lne is ﬁrst estimated using OLS on a vector η of socio-demographic variables and
the instrument as lne = η.δ + υ and then the residual υ̂ = lne − η.δ enters in the
estimation of the demand system.
This gives the CAIDS model in budget shares as
wi = αi + ti(d) +
∑
j
γijlnpj + β
1
i [lnφ
∗
1 − lnA1(p)]
+β2i [lnφ
∗
2 − lnA2(p)] + ρiυ̂ + ξi (1.8)
where ρi captures any endogeneity of total expenditure and ξi is the error term.
The system is ﬁnally estimated using feasible generalized nonlinear least squares
method and imposing the QUAIDS standard regulatory conditions: adding-up (
∑
i
αi =
1), homogeneity (
∑
i
γij =
∑
j
γij = 0,
∑
i
τir = 0 and
∑
i
βki = 0 for each
k = 1, 2) and symmetry (γij = γji, ∀i 6= j).
In our empirical exercise, we estimate the model for two sub-samples of families
with children: married male-headed and single female-headed families. The basic
motivation behind our choice of the two sub-samples is that our assumption that
children may be treated diﬀerently in the two family structures and hence their
bargaining power and welfare may vary.9
not alone in this respect (see, for instance, Dauphin et al. (2011) and Mangiavacchi and Piccoli
(2017) for recent ones who only consider endogeneity of total expenditure but assume exogeneity
of prices).
9Estimating a single model merging married male-headed and married female-headed together
suﬀers from very low sample sizes for the latter. For drawing better gender-based compar-
isons, we exclude married female-headed and single male-headed households, both of which are
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Post-estimation Issues
Once the estimated resources of adults φ∗1 and children φ
∗
2 are recovered, aggregate
resource shares Sk are given by
Sk =
φ∗k
e
, k = 1, 2
where e is total household expenditure. Per-child and per-adult resources rk and
resource shares sk are given by
rk =
φ∗k
hk
and sk =
Sk
hk
where hk is the number of adults or children.
The identiﬁcation of resource shares allows us the measurement of poverty and in-
equality at individual level. Unlike the traditional method, which relies on counting
of families with children living below the poverty line to identify children as poor,
this new method provides the true poverty of children. It also provides better esti-
mation of the depth and severity of poverty. In the empirical estimation, we consider
the national poverty line that is based on the Cost of Basic Needs and takes into
account both food and non-food needs. Two types of poverty estimates are com-
puted for each index: one group based on estimated resources rk for children and
adults, which take into account the intrahousehold resource allocation, and another
based on equal-sharing expenditures y at the household level (adult-equivalents in
our case). Haddad and Kanbur (1990) show that poverty measures which ignore
intrahousehold allocation understate the level of poverty.
Consider two expenditure gap functions, g(rk, z) convex in estimated individual
resources rk and g(y, z) convex in household level expenditures y, deﬁned as
g(rk, z) =

(
z−rk
z
)α
, rk ≤ z
0, rk > z
and g(y, z) =

(
z−y
z
)α
, y ≤ z
0, y > z
where z is poverty line. α is a measure of poverty aversion. When α = 0, the
very negligible. Hence, we separately estimate for married male-headed and for single-mother
families with children. This is also due to the fact that some of our distribution factors ac-
count for parental (wife-husband) diﬀerences in age and education which cannot be deﬁned for
single-mothers. Bargain et al. (2014) do similarly in their alternative estimations.
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function g measures headcount. α = 1 implies depth, and α = 2 indicates severity
of poverty. Note also that it is only when α ≥ 1 that g(rk, z) and g(y, z) become
convex in rk and y respectively. Hence, the FGT (Foster et al., 1984) poverty indices
based on individual resources rk and adult-equivalent household level expenditure y
are given by
Pαk(rk, z) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
g(rk, z) and Pα(y, z) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
g(y, z)
where n = 1, 2, ..., N is the number of households with children. For convex g(rk, z)
and g(y, z) (i.e. α = 1, 2), Haddad and Kanbur (1990) show that P1k(rk, z) >
P1(y, z) and P2k(rk, z) > P2(y, z). These say that both poverty depth and sever-
ity measures that ignore intrahousehold resource allocation understate the level of
poverty. Nonetheless, where convexity fails (i.e. α = 0), Haddad and Kanbur
(1990) argue that P0k(rk, z) ≷ P0(y, z), implying a headcount ratio with no account
of intrahousehold resource allocation can overstate or understate poverty and is an
empirical matter. Later, we will verify these hypotheses using data from Ethiopia.
1.3. Ethiopian Expenditure Data
Data for the study come from the 2013/14 wave of Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey
(ESS) collected jointly by the World Bank and the Central Statistical Agency of
Ethiopia (CSA) as part of the Living Standard Measurement Study-Integrated Sur-
veys of Agriculture (LSMS-ISA). ESS is a panel survey with three waves to date
(2011/12, 2013/14 and 2015/16). While the sample design of the ﬁrst wave provides
representative estimates for rural-area and small-town households, subsequent waves
include medium and large towns and cities so that they have become nationally-
representative. It uses a stratiﬁed, two-stage design where regions of Ethiopia serve
as the strata. The ﬁrst stage involves the selection of primary sampling units (or
enumeration areas) using simple random sampling. The second stage of sampling
entails the selection of households. Data came from 3969, 5262 and 4954 house-
holds in the three waves. ESS contains household-level data on a range of modules
including expenditure, assets, shocks, non-farm enterprises, credit and farm produc-
tion. Individual data on demographics, education, health, some expenditure items
and time use are also collected. Moreover, community-level data as well as data on
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prices from local markets are available. However, in addition to being a rural-only
survey, the 2011/12 wave lacks expenditure data on education, health, housing and
food away from home. Lack of price data for assignable clothing and other goods
such as education and personal care also forced us to exclude the 2015/16 wave.
This study, therefore, employs the 2013/14 wave. All of the waves of ESS do not
collect expenditures on durable goods except on home furniture. Only information
on the number of ownership of more than 35 assets is gathered. A wealth index from
these assets is used to instrument total household expenditure. Individual-level labor
incomes and household-level income from various non-labor sources, transfers and
non-farm enterprises are aggregated with farm income which is extracted from the
production, sales, home consumption and associated costs of various crops, livestock
and their by-products. The wealth index aggregate of ESS by FAO's Rural Income
Generating Activities (RIGA) project are used in this study.
We aggregate the various non-durable expenditure items into four expenditure groups:
food at home and alcohol, clothing, household utilities and energy, and other goods.
The details are available in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The food and alcohol expen-
diture group is aggregated from 26 food items and a sub-group of alcoholic drinks.
The second group in our expenditure aggregation is clothing. It is composed of non-
assignable linen as well as assignable clothes, shoes and fabric for men, women, boys
and girls. The third expenditure group consists of household utilities and energy.10
All other non-durable expenditures are aggregated in the fourth group: other goods,
composed of spending on education, food away from home, cigarettes, laundry and
other personal care, and transport.
Prices data come in various forms. For food at home items, we calculate unit values
from expenditure and quantity information. For the majority of non-food items,
local market prices collected in ESS price questionnaire are employed. For alcoholic
drinks, food away from home and for non-food items whose prices are missing in ESS
(namely, water, electricity, communication, education, personal care items, matches,
and assignable and non-assignable clothing), we resort to the 2013/14 CSA's average
10We exclude housing rents because only 13% of households with children reported rents and no
housing prices are available. Given that over 70% of our sample are of rural households and over
92% have their own home so that they do not pay rents, this assumption of equal treatment of
rents will not pose a serious problem. The associated welfare diﬀerences could be captured by
diﬀerences in spending on various household utilities and energy items.
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retail prices. We ﬁrst aggregate them up to the zone (provincial) level and then
match them to the ESS data.
From a total of 5262 households, we select 3196 families with children composed
of two sub-samples: two-parent male-headed (2467 households) and single-parent
female-headed (729 households). Exclusive/assignable consumption is based on a
host of non-durable expenditure items. Clothing and footwear expenditures, col-
lected at male, female, girl and boy levels as well as education expenditures, col-
lected at individual level, are clearly assignable. Further, we assign expenditures
on alcoholic drinks, stimulants (chat/khat and cigarettes) and some personal care
items to adults.
Table 1.1 presents the descriptive statistics of key variables by family structure and
for the whole sample. As expected, the vast majority of household resources (about
70 percent in male-headed and 65 percent in single-mother households) are spent on
food at home and alcohol. However, compared to the male-headed, single-mother
families spend a little higher share on non-necessities (household utilities and energy
and other goods). Moreover, t-test results for mean diﬀerences in observed resource
and shares of each child and adult exhibit statistical diﬀerences in the two family
types.
We consider 15 demographic variables referring to the household in general and its
members (head and children) in particular. If the head sick and Christian (Muslim
and other religions being the reference category) capture the head's characteristics.
The number of children who fell sick and, to account for the age factor, the number
of older children (aged between 15 and 17) are incorporated to control for children's
attributes. Two household level characteristics are used to control for economic
status: female employment ratio (working females over household total labor of
14-60 years) and if the household has safe water source. Presence of other adults
than parents is also controlled. Whether seasonal diﬀerences matter is captured by
a dummy if the household was interviewed in February. Exposures to price shock
and natural shocks are also accounted for. Finally, spatial diﬀerences in demand are
controlled by incorporating dummies for rural areas as well as ﬁve regions (Amhara,
Oromia, SNNP, Tigray and Other regions), with living in the capital, Addis Ababa,
being the reference category.
In total, 71% of our sample households live in rural areas, 75% for the traditional
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Table 1.1.: Descriptive statistics of key variables: ESS 2013/14
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male-headed and 55% for single-mother ones. Moreover, a ﬁfth of them are drawn
from each of Amhara region, Oromia region and other smaller regions, a quarter from
SNNP region, a tenth from Tigray and the rest from Addis Ababa. Both family types
statistically diﬀer in almost all of the demographic variables considered. Notably,
average household size in married male-headed families is 5.8, of whom 3.3 (57%)
are children, while these ﬁgures are 4.0 and 2.1 (53%) in single-mother families. For
the total sample, children account for 56% of the 5.4 family size. The latest available
census shows that children constitute over 52% of the population in Ethiopia.
We use six distribution factors to partly capture the rule governing bargaining be-
tween children and their parents: education and age diﬀerences between wife and
husband (only for the male-headed sub-sample), if all children are in school, propor-
tion of female children, proportion of women, and number of non-biological children.
Distribution factors, by deﬁnition, do not aﬀect preferences but do inﬂuence bargain-
ing power. As that feature of not aﬀecting preferences is diﬃcult to verify, we prefer
motivating the choice of the majority of the distribution factors from the literature.
Education and age diﬀerences or ratios of couples are quite popular determinants of
intrahousehold resource allocation (Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Menon et al., 2017;
Chavas et al., 2017). To capture the role played by gender in intrahousehold resource
allocation, we use two ratios - proportions of female children and female adults, the
ﬁrst of which is also employed by Mangiavacchi and Piccoli (2017). Lastly, we con-
sider as exogenous the number of extended or non-biological children which may also
aﬀect bargaining power in the household without aﬀecting consumption choices.
Note that, as demonstrated in Table 1.1, the various budget shares signiﬁcantly diﬀer
in the two family types implies that it is wrong to analyze intrahousehold bargaining
of children with adults merging the two sub-samples and using single-motherhood
as a distribution factor. For married male-headed households, the husband on av-
erage has 1.3 more years of education than his wife, which could reach up to 15
years. There is also a substantial age gap between couples, the wife being 8.5 years
younger on average, and ranging between 40 years younger and 25 years older.11
In over 70 percent of single-mother households, school-age children attend school
which is signiﬁcantly higher than in male-headed households (60 percent). While
11This is not in fact surprising as women in Sub-Saharan Africa typically marry older men, with
median diﬀerence of 7 years (UN Population Division, 2001, World Marriage Patterns, New
York). Bargain et al. (2014) also ﬁnd for Cote d'Ivoire that mean diﬀerence ranges between 8.2
to 8.7 depending on the number of children.
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the proportion of girls and boys is almost balanced in both family structures, single-
mother families have obviously more adult women. Moreover, not all children live
with their biological parents: as many as four and eight children in male-headed and
single-mother households are non-biological (extended) respectively. These distribu-
tion factors are proposed to play a role in the resource allocation between children
and their parents.
1.4. Results and Discussion
This section presents the results of our estimations and discussions are also made
where deemed necessary. After brieﬂy presenting our intermediate results from the
demand system estimations, we present and discuss our estimates on child resource
shares and poverty. Analyses are also made disaggregating the estimates by number
of children, region and rural/urban residence.
1.4.1. Demand System Estimation Results
We estimate two collective AIDS models: a quadratic version for married male-
headed households and a linear version for single female-headed households. These
speciﬁcations are dictated by the Engel curves in shown in Figure A.1 and estima-
tion results are summarized in Table A.3 in the Appendix. In addition to having the
expected sign, the majority of price- and expenditure-related parameters are signif-
icantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional levels. Control parameters ρi capturing
endogeneity of total expenditure are signiﬁcant in three-fourths of both sub-sample
regressions indicating that the log of total expenditure would have been endogenous
had it not been instrumented. Results of the regression of log of total expenditure
on the wealth index instrument and other variables, whose residuals enter in the
demand systems regressions for our controlling exercise, are summarized in Table
A.2 in the Appendix.
Some signiﬁcant non-spatial demographic eﬀects on non-durable consumption are
observed. For example, religion plays a role where families headed by a Christian
male, relative to Muslims and other believers, have lower spending on food and
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alcohol but higher on household utilities and energy. While the sickness of the head
increases food spending and reduces clothing, more number of sick children does
the opposite. And as expected, both family types with more older children (15 to
17 years) as well as other adults have higher clothing demands. Households hit by
price shocks adjust by reducing consumption of food alcohol and increasing that of
other goods. These correlations reverse direction when shocks are natural disasters.
Regarding spatial eﬀects, there exist signiﬁcant diﬀerences in demand across regions.
As expected, compared to living in the capital city, living in less urbanized regions
of Amhara, Oromia, SNNP and other smaller regions is associated with higher food
expenditure shares and lower demands for utilities and energy and other goods
categories.
The associated income and prices elasticities are also estimated and they are sum-
marized, along with their standard errors, in Table A.4 of the Appendix. The signs
are in line with theory. Both children and adults reveal almost similar income elas-
ticity patterns: inelastic for food and clothing, almost unitary for utilities and elastic
for other goods. Magnitude wise, adults are a little more elastic than children for
clothing and utilities. Consistent with consumption theory, all own-price elasticities
(uncompensated and compensated) are also negative. In particular, own-price ef-
fects indicate that except the other goods category, which is elastic, all categories are
inelastic. The compensated cross-price elasticities generally suggest substitutabil-
ity: food and alcohol category is a signiﬁcant substitute for clothing category and
other goods category, and the latter are substitutes for food, clothing and utilities
categories in traditional families.
The estimated coeﬃcients of the sharing function are presented in Table 1.2. Five out
of six distribution factors in married male-headed and and two out of four in single
female-headed families signiﬁcantly aﬀect the bargaining power between children
and adults. The years of schooling diﬀerence between parents (wife minus husband)
positively and signiﬁcantly aﬀects adults' sharing rule, against the expectation that
educated mothers, relative to fathers, are more altruistic towards their children. In
contrast, Dunbar et al. (2013) ﬁnd that higher mother's education is associated with
higher bargaining power (resource shares) for both children and women in Malawi.
The negative coeﬃcient of the diﬀerence in age between the wife and the husband
also implies that older mothers tend to keep more resources to children.
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Table 1.2.: Coeﬃcients of the sharing rule's expenditure scaling m-function: bar-
gaining
Variable
Male-headed Single-mother
Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ.
Educ. diﬀ. (wife-husb.) 0.187*** (0.037) -
Age diﬀ. (wife-husb.) -0.069*** (0.015) -
All children in school -0.324* (0.166) 1.200** (0.504)
% of female children -0.409* (0.228) -0.181 (0.327)
% of women 1.188 (0.862) 3.178*** (2 .940)
# of non-biol children 0.291** (0.145) 0.120 (0 .122)
Notes: *, ** & *** show signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% & 1% levels respectively. Standard errors, corrected for clustering
and sampling weights, are in parentheses.
When all children are in school, their relative resource sharing rules are higher in
traditional families where the male is the head though this eﬀect is reversed in
single-mother families. On the other hand, parents with more female children keep
less resources to themselves, as shown by the negative coeﬃcient attached to the
proportion of female children, also suggesting a boy-girl discrimination as docu-
mented elsewhere (Deaton, 1989; Gibson and Rozelle, 2004; Dunbar et al., 2013).
This distribution factor nonetheless is not signiﬁcant in single-parent families. Also
as expected, the proportion of women reduces children's sharing rule. Lastly, the
number of non-biological (extended) children is also another distribution factor and
it reduces the resource share of children in both family types though it is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant in single-mother households. This is in line with discrimination by
adults against children who are not their own biological daughters or sons. These
ﬁndings have important policy implications such as in income transfer programmes
targeted at child poverty since their eﬀectiveness is largely conditional on parental
altruism (Bhalotra, 2004).
1.4.2. Estimated Children’s Resources and Poverty
1.4.2.1. Children’s Resources
Based on observed individual expenditures and estimated expenditure-scaling func-
tion coeﬃcients, which are demographically-augmented, we compute the sharing
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Table 1.3.: Means of estimated resources and shares by family type
Male-headed Single-mother Whole sample
Total expenditure (ETB) (e) 2221 (53.04) 1664 (87.82) 2115 (46.33)
Resources in ETB:
Children's resources (φ2) 1033*** (28.02) 804*** (56.76) 989 (25.18)
Each child 339*** (8.87) 433*** (20.00) 357 (8.37)
Adults' resources (φ1) 1188*** (35.38) 860*** (44.23) 1126 (30.01)
Each adult 491 (14.82) 457 (19.70) 485 (12.57)
Resource shares:
Children's resource share (S2 = φ2/e) 0.47* (0.005) 0.49* (0.008) 0.48 (0.005)
Each child (r2 = S2/h2) 0.16*** (0.002) 0.30*** (0.007) 0.19 (0.002)
Adults' resource share (S1 = φ1/e) 0.53* (0.005) 0.51* (0.008) 0.52 (0.005)
Each adult (r1 = S1/h2) 0.23*** (0.003) 0.32*** (0.007) 0.24 (0.003)
Notes: ** & *** show signiﬁcance of mean diﬀerence in male-headed and single-mother sub-samples at 5% &
1% levels respectively. ETB = Ethiopian Birr; 1 ETB = 0.0524 US$ (2013/14 Avg.) (NBE). All observations
are weighted to make estimates nationally representative. Standard errors, corrected for clustering and sampling
weights, are in parentheses.
rule or the shadow resource allocation between children and adults. The average es-
timates for both family structures and the whole sample, along with observed shares
for comparison, are presented in Table 1.3.
Our estimates generally reveal signiﬁcant inequalities in intrahousehold resource
allocation. In aggregate terms, children command slightly less resources (48% of
total expenditure in the whole sample, 47% in male-headed and 49% in single-
mother families). These are not of course surprising, given that children constitute
55%, 56%, 53% in the total sample, male-headed and single-mother households
respectively. Recall that the observed aggregate shares indicate equal allocations
between children and adults in all family structures.
The distributions of children's and adults' resource shares in the space of total
expenditure are depicted in Figure A.2 in the Appendix. For the whole of the
expenditure distribution, the trends in the shares remain generally similar. The
ﬁnding of almost horizontal curves is very important as it goes inline with our
identiﬁcation restriction that the sharing rule is not aﬀected by total household
expenditure.
Aggregate child and adult resource shares are aﬀected by the number of children and
adults and hence are less informative. As a result, we need to consider the average
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per-child resource shares in households of diﬀerent sizes. Intrahousehold inequalities
between children and adults widen when one considers average per-member shares.
In the whole sample, while each child claims less than a ﬁfth of household resources,
each adult gets about a quarter. Not only a child in single-mother families (30%)
commands more resources than that in male-headed families (16%) but also the
gap between children and adults is lower in the former than in the latter. This
ﬁnding is in line with that elsewhere in Africa. Bargain et al. (2014) ﬁnd, for
instance in Cote d'Ivoire, that in single-mother families, children claim higher share
of household resources (31%) than in two-parent families (23%) which are likely
to be male-headed. As expected, families headed by unmarried females have lower
total household expenditure (1664 ETB) than those headed by married males (2221
ETB). However, single-mothers spend more for each child (433 ETB per month)
than male-headed couples (339 ETB per month) suggesting that female heads are
more altruistic to their children than male heads.
1.4.2.2. Child Poverty
While resource shares provide information on who gets what from the household's
cake, they do not tell whether the allocated cake to each member is enough to satisfy
their needs. A step computing member's welfare and any intrahousehold disparity
therein is needed. For instance, in addition to analyzing poverty among children,
one can assess any existing inequality between child and adult poverty.
Accordingly, we use the estimated per-member resources to compute FGT rates
of poverty incidence, gap and severity among children and adults for both family
types and the whole sample of households with children. For comparison, rates
are also computed based on adult-equivalent (equivalent scale) expenditures where
resources are assumed to be shared equally among members. The poverty threshold
considered is the (oﬃcial) national poverty line computed using the Cost of Basic
Needs approach.12 Results are presented in Table 1.4. Note that the new approach
of employing estimated resources in poverty measurement provides us with more
12We use the national poverty line (MoFED, 2012) since it is used to target the poor in the
country and is based on their needs. In 2010/11, the poverty line was 315 ETB/person/month
(3781 ETB/person/year) and after adjusted for inﬂation, it becomes 501 ETB/person/month
in 2013/14.
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Table 1.4.: Poverty measures based on new method and traditional approaches (%)
Male-headed families Single-mother families Whole sample
New
Method
(1)
Household
level
(2)
New
Method
(3)
Household
level
(4)
New
Method
(5)
Household
level
(6)
Child poverty headcount P0 83.8***
66.5u
72.9***
61.2u
81.7
65.5u
Adult poverty headcount P0 70.2 69.7 70.1
Child poverty gap rate P1 45.9***
27.8u
33.0***
22.7u
43.4
26.8u
Adult poverty gap rate P1 32.3*** 28.2*** 31.5
Child poverty severity P2 29.6***
14.6u
18.8***
11.2u
27.6
14.0u
Adult poverty severity P2 18.4*** 14.4*** 17.6
Notes: *, ** & *** show signiﬁcance of mean diﬀerence of poverty rates (based on estimated resources) between
male-headed and single-mother sub-samples at 10%, 5% & 1% levels respectively. ushows household level or equal
sharing-based poverty rates are less (or understate poverty) than estimated resources-based rates at 1%. MoFED
(2012)'s 2010/11 CBN-based national poverty line, adjusted for inﬂation, is considered. All observations are weighted
to make estimates nationally representative.
disaggregations in the indices compared to the traditional approach (shown here by
an extra row per family member group and poverty index).13
Some immediate results are worth noting. Firstly, it is comforting to notice from
columns 1, 3 and 5 that indicators of poverty incidence, gap and severity are higher
for children than for adults. In the whole sample, about 84% of children live below
the national poverty line, lower at 70% among adults.14 Such gaps between child
and adult poverty incidence also exist in both family types though the one in single-
mothers is lower. This ﬁnding strengthens the previous evidence of intrahousehold
inequality in resource allocation. Secondly, the incidence, depth and severity of
poverty among children in male-headed families are signiﬁcantly higher than those
in female-headed families.
Thirdly, in all cases, our estimated resources count more poor children (and adults)
than what household level or equal-sharing methods do; and the same is true for
13We do not need to make a ﬁxed adjustment to the poverty line to consider the lower needs of
children such as the OECD scale. Our estimation of the intrahousehold resource allocation is
such that a fair distribution of goods not assigned to members is corrected by our expenditure-
scaling function (Menon and Perali, 2012) whose estimates were presented in the previous
section. Note also that Bargain et al. (2014) question the relevance of the OECD scale to
adjusting child poverty lines.
14Care must, however, be exercised in taking these ﬁgures. The 2013/14 round of the ESS con-
siders a select of consumer goods, missing certain food aggregates. The poverty estimates here
primarily aim to show use of resources share as an alternative method to the traditional ones,
and hence cannot easily be compared with other estimates such as those in MoFED (2012).
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higher child poverty measures (compare estimates in columns 1, 3 and 5 corre-
spondingly with those in columns 2, 4 and 6). All the diﬀerences are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This shows that the traditional approach of measuring
poverty based on equal resource sharing, which by default ignores intrahousehold
distribution among members, understates poverty situation. We thus verify the
hypotheses of Haddad and Kanbur (1990). Recent collective consumption model
studies also document similar conclusions from other sub-Saharan Africa countries
although their analyses are restricted only to poverty headcount ratio. Dunbar et al.
(2013) on Malawi and Bargain et al. (2014) on Cote d'Ivoire ﬁnd that standard
poverty indices understate the incidence of child poverty.
Child poverty estimates discussed so far do not tell any existing disparity in poverty
status with a change in family size. One may also be interested to see what sacriﬁces
parents and/or children have to pay when more children join the family. Table 1.5
summarizes poverty headcount estimates by number of children.15
As expected, child poverty increases with the number of children in the household.
In the whole sample of families with children, incidence of child poverty increases
from 65% when there is only one child to 93% when families host more than four
children. Dunbar et al. (2013) also ﬁnd similar positive relationship between child
poverty and number of children. Similar trends are observed in the two family
structures. However, the previous ﬁnding that children in single-mother families
are less likely to be poor than those in male-headed couples no more stays when
disaggregated by the number of children. No diﬀerence in child poverty incidence
rates is statistically signiﬁcant except the overall rate. On the other hand, like
in the overall case, poverty among children consistently remains worse than that
among adults though the gap falls with an increase in the number of children. If
intrahousehold resource allocation was ignored, poverty would be understated with
any number of children, once again conﬁrming the Haddad and Kanbur (1990)
hypotheses.
15We are aware that modeling multi-children and multi-adults households is challenged by
economies of scale. For instance, children may share clothing, books, etc. thereby underes-
timating child resource shares and overestimating poverty among larger families. Our current
estimations cannot consider this and it remains a limitation of the paper. In fact, this issue of
joint consumption by children is a limitation of collective consumption models to date (Bargain
et al., 2014; Mangiavacchi et al., 2018) and forms a future research agenda. Some prefer to use
a very restrictive sample such as households with just one child (?) or separate estimations by
size (Bargain et al., 2014). While we provide results for families with one child as well as with
two, three, four and over four children, the estimates should be taken with caution.
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Table 1.5.: Child poverty headcount rates (%) by number of children
One
child
Two
children
Three
children
Four
children
Over four
children
Overall
Male-headed households:
Poverty rate: child 65.5 78.8 87.2 87.5 92.9 83.8***
Poverty rate: adult 47.4*** 61.5** 71.0 78.8 84.1 70.2
Pov. rate: household level 41.1** 57.5** 68.3 72.2 83.4 66.5***
Single-mother households:
Poverty rate: child 64.1 76.7 78.1 86.5 92.7 72.9***
Poverty rate: adult 62.5*** 71.7** 76.5 81.1 86.5 69.7
Pov. rate: household level 53.2** 67.3** 63.6 66.4 79.1 61.2***
Whole sample:
Poverty rate: child 64.9 78.3 86.2 87.4 92.9 81.7
Poverty rate: adult 53.9 64.1 71.6 79.0 84.2 70.1
Pov. rate: household level 46.3 60.0 67.7 71.6 83.2 65.5
Notes: *, ** & *** show signiﬁcance of poverty diﬀerence between male-headed and single-mother sub-samples at
10%, 5% & 1% levels respectively. All observations are weighted to make estimates nationally representative.
1.4.2.3. Child Poverty, Household Poverty and Undernutrition Overlap
A further beneﬁt of the new method to child poverty estimation using resource shares
is that it helps to look at the existing overlap between the poverty of children, adults
and other members. What proportion of poor children live with non-poor adults?
What portion of poor children live in non-poor households? Do these diﬀer when
the head is a female? We also provide some evidence on the overlap between child
undernutrition and monetary poverty at child, adult and household levels.
Table 1.6 summarizes estimates of the overlap between child-, adult- and household-
level poverty by family structure. Two-thirds of poor children live with poor adults
or households in general, irrespective of family structure. However, the proportion
of poor children living with non-poor adults is non-negligible: 15 percent in the
whole sample. Far less portion of poor children live with non-poor adults in female-
headed families (8 percent) than in male-headed ones (17 percent), supporting our
previous evidence that single mothers in general are more equal to their children
than male-heads. Note that these estimates only slightly change when child poverty
is allowed to overlap with household poverty. Our estimates also show that the
match in poverty status of children and either of adults or households in general
ranges between 80 to 87 percent depending on the family type and comparison group
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Table 1.6.: Overlap between child, adult and household poverty by family struc-
ture
Male-headed families Single-mother families Whole sample
Adult is poor HH is poor Adult is poor HH is poor Adult is poor HH is poor
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Child
is
poor
Yes 0.67
(0.013)
0.17
(0.011)
0.66
(0.013)
0.18
(0.011)
0.65
(0.024)
0.08
(0.014)
0.60
(0.025)
0.13
(0.017)
0.67
(0.011)
0.15
(0.009)
0.67
(0.011)
0.17
(0.009)
No 0.03
(0.005)
0.13
(0.008)
0.00
(0.002)
0.16
(0.009)
0.05
(0.009)
0.22
(0.020)
0.01
(0.004)
0.26
(0.021)
0.04
(0.004)
0.15
(0.008)
0.01
(0.002)
0.18
(0.009)
Status match* 0.80 0.82 0.87 0.86 0.82 0.83
Poor in ALL three 0.63 (0.013) 0.59 (0.025) 0.62 (0.012)
Notes: *Status match implies the proportion of children with similar status in two measures. All estimates are
weighted to make them representative of the corresponding population. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 1.7.: Overlap between child undernutrition and poverty of children, adults
and the household
Child poverty Adult poverty Household poverty
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Child stunting
Any stunted 0.24 (0.010) 0.03 (0.004) 0.21 (0.010) 0.06 (0.005) 0.19 (0.009) 0.09 (0.006)
No stunted 0.58 (0.012) 0.15 (0.008) 0.50 (0.012) 0.24 (0.010) 0.47 (0.012) 0.26 (0.010)
Status match* 0.39 0.45 0.45
Notes: *Status match implies the proportion of children with similar status in two measures. All estimates are
weighted to make them representative of the corresponding population. Standard errors in parentheses.
considered. Moreover, only about 60 percent of poor children reside with a poor
adult and in a poor household which is slightly higher in male-headed households.
Table 1.7 provides further evidence on other overlaps for the whole sample, this time
the overlap of child stunting with child poverty, adult poverty and household poverty
where stunting here refers to prevalence of any under-7 child who is stunted. Two
interesting results stand out. First, undernourished children still exist in monetar-
ily non-poor households which is also consistent with recent ﬁndings across Africa
(Brown et al., 2017). Second, the prevalence of undernourished children decreases
from 9%, 6% and 3% as one changes the child stunting overlap with household-,
adult- and child-level poverty estimates respectively.
These evidences lend support to the burgeoning literature on the role of inequality
in intrahousehold resource allocation on household member's welfare (Haddad and
Kanbur, 1990; Dunbar et al., 2013; Bargain et al., 2014). In particular, it adds to
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Table 1.8.: Spatial distribution of resource shares and poverty headcount rate (%)
Regions Rural/urban
Addis
Ababa
Amh-
ara
Oro-
mia
SNNP Tig-
ray
Other
regions
Rural Small
towns
Medium
& large
Male-headed:
Per-child resource share 0.21*** 0.16***0.16***0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17***
Per-adult resource share 0.26 0.24***0.22***0.22*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.28***
Poverty headcount: child 50.9* 85.2** 84.0 87.2 78.5*** 80.7*** 87.5** 74.2 58.7
Poverty headcount: adult 26.9** 73.2 69.5 77.7* 61.1 59.0 76.1 56.2* 29.6***
Poverty headcount: household 16.5 72.1 64.6 72.8 59.2** 57.0 73.2 47.1 21.7***
Single-mother:
Per-child resource share 0.26*** 0.33***0.27***0.30*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.32*** 0.32***
Per-adult resource share 0.24 0.35***0.30***0.33*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32***
Poverty headcount: child 35.6* 76.1** 76.4 86.3 66.9*** 63.7*** 80.6** 63.7 54.9
Poverty headcount: adult 46.0** 73.8 69.4 85.2* 58.6 54.0 76.2 68.7* 52.2***
Poverty headcount: household 27.2 65.0 65.1 73.4 46.7** 52.1 69.7 52.3 40.9***
Whole sample:
Per-child resource share 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.22
Per-adult resource share 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.29
Poverty headcount: child 44.7 83.1 82.9 87.1 73.0 77.8 86.4 71.3 57.4
Poverty headcount: adult 34.5 73.3 69.5 78.8 60.3 58.1 76.1 59.3 37.4
Poverty headcount: household 20.9 70.5 64.7 72.9 55.1 56.2 72.7 48.5 28.5
Notes: *, ** & *** show signiﬁcance of mean diﬀerence in male-headed and single-mother sub-samples at 10%, 5%
& 1% levels respectively. All observations are weighted to make estimates representative.
the rejection of the widely held view that poor children live with/ in poor adults/
households (Brown et al., 2017, 2018).. From a policy perspective, it questions the
eﬀectiveness of targeting poor households for a social protection aiming at improving
child welfare.
1.4.3. Spatial Distribution of Child Resource Shares and Poverty
Answering the question of where on the map children make the most/least decisions
on home resources and locating poor children aid policymakers interested on the
issue. Hence, average resource share and poverty estimates are disaggregated by
region and place of residence (rural, small towns, and medium and large towns).16
16Based on the 2007 Population Census, the ESS deﬁnes a small-sized town as one with popula-
tion of less than 10,000; medium-sized between 10,000 and 100,000 and big-sized greater than
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Figure 1.1.: Regional distribution of child resource shares and poverty headcount
rates (%)
Note: Estimates are representative only to regions of Addis Ababa, Amhara, Oromia, SNNP and Tigray.
Table 1.8 summarizes the results.
Looking at the average resource share estimates, three ﬁndings stand out. Firstly,
in line with our previous ﬁnding, a child has less resource share than an adult
across regions and rural/urban residence. Secondly, a child's resource share shows
no systematic relation with urbanization. For a map of regional disparities in child
resource shares for the whole sample, see the left panel of Figure 1.1. Average per-
adult expenditure shares vary across regions between 20% and 26% in the whole
sample. Thirdly, across all regions and residence types, single-mothers signiﬁcantly
allocate more resources children compared with married males.
Regarding poverty incidence, disaggregated estimates in Table 1.8 similarly disclose
presence of large spatial disparities. For instance, the chance of children falling in
poverty in male-headed (resp. single-mother) families ranges between 88% (81%) in
rural areas to 59% (55%) in medium and large towns, and falling as low as 51% (46%)
in the nation's largest city and capital, Addis Ababa. There is signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in child poverty incidence between male-headed and single-mother households in
the majority of the regions and rural areas. On the other hand, if intrahousehold
resource allocation was ignored, poverty would once again be understated and we
would notice no signiﬁcant poverty prevalence diﬀerence between the two family
structures in all regions (except Tigray) and rural/urban areas (except medium and
100,000.
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large towns). Figure 1.1 (right panel) visually maps the disparities in child poverty
across regions for the whole sample of families with children.
1.5. Concluding Remarks
Children have long been sidelined in the literature as decision makers in household
resources. While they could be a victim of the widely-evidenced intrahousehold
inequality, parental altruism may beneﬁt them. The scant collective model evidence
on children's shares of household resources and poverty in developing countries that
are sizably populated by children is inconclusive. We estimate a complete collective
demand model to recover children's resource shares and analyze poverty in married
male-headed and single female-headed families in Ethiopia. Identiﬁcation strategy
of the sharing rule relies on use of private exclusive goods and distribution factors.
Results generally conﬁrm disparities in intrahousehold resource allocation and poverty
which vary with the number of children, family type and space. The allocation is
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by parental diﬀerences in education and age, child education,
proportions of female children and women as well as number of non-biological chil-
dren. Children command less household resources than adults and children in single-
mother families have higher resource shares than those in male-headed families.
After using resource shares for computing incidence, depth and severity of poverty,
we also ﬁnd that children are poorer than adults. Single-mothers not only are more
altruistic to their children, they also avoid higher child poverty than married male
heads although this seems to disappear when the number of children increases. We
ﬁnd that traditional poverty measures, which by construction ignore intrahousehold
allocation, understate child (and adult) poverty compared to those based on our
resource shares. Our estimates also show that non-poor families also host poor
children, unlike the general belief that poor children live only with poor adults
and households. We also ﬁnd that monetarily non-poor adults and households host
stunted children. Finally, regional and rural-urban disparities exist in both child
resource shares and poverty.
Our results are important for few intervention issues. Firstly, by disclosing intra-
household inequalities in resource allocation and poverty that children do better
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only at low family size, the results lend support to fertility interventions. Ignor-
ing this inequality means a misleading picture of the incidence, depth and severity
of poverty. Secondly, gender of the household head matters to children as moth-
ers found to be more pro-child. Thirdly, the overlaps between child poverty, adult
poverty, household poverty and child stunting question the eﬀectiveness of target-
ing just poor households for a social protection aiming at improving child welfare.
Lastly, pro-rural spatial redistributive eﬀorts are implied to reduce disparity.
The study contributes to the methodological and evidence gap in system-wide es-
timation of resource shares and use of them in poverty estimation and analysis.
Yet, given that child well-being is multidimensional, the overlap between the new
monetary child poverty and multidimensional poverty as well as impact of social
protection on children's resource shares and well-being remain as future research
agenda which the remaining two essays investigate.
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2. Children’s Multidimensional
Deprivation, Monetary Poverty
and Undernutrition
2.1. Introduction
Child well-being is multidimensional. This is clearly reﬂected when the world com-
mits itself via the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) to meet
children's rights and well-being such as being able to be healthy, learn, develop and
play. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) also place a lot of emphasis on
multidimensional deprivation. Yet, 689 million children in developing countries live
in multidimensional poverty (Alkire et al., 2017) which only slightly decreased from
over one billion deprived in one or more dimensions (Gordon et al., 2003).Children,
compared with adults, are over-represented in poverty, whether measured using
monetary or multidimensional methods (Newhouse et al., 2016; Alkire et al., 2017).
Most of the literature on multidimensional deprivation analysis uses Demographic
and Health Surveys (DHSs). However, DHSs lack expenditure data and little eﬀort
has been made to use data from the Living Standard Measurement Studies (LSMS)
surveys for such analyses (Klasen, 2000). In addition, there is only scant evidence
linking together monetary and non-monetary dimensions and the majority of these
are at the household level (Klasen, 2000; Bruck and Kebede, 2013). Only few recent
eﬀorts bring in intrahousehold resource allocation to the focus and analyze the links
between children's undernutrition and child/ household monetary poverty (Brown
et al., 2017, 2018).
This study ﬁlls the aforementioned evidence gap by bringing in the collective house-
hold consumption model's resource sharing rule to monetary poverty and multidi-
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mensional deprivation measurement. Unlike the majority of the available literature
on multidimensional poverty, which is based on household level data and assumes
equal access to services or equal resource distribution among all family members,
one of our indices includes a monetary indicator that capture children's bargaining
power. Moreover, the study considers a nutrition-based deﬁnition of child well-being
and looks at its overlap with monetary poverty besides the latter's overlap with mul-
tidimensional deprivation. In particular, we ask: Are all monetarily non-poor chil-
dren also not undernourished? Do non-poor households host stunted children? What
portion of children identiﬁed monetarily-poor is also multidimensionally-deprived?
Lastly, we look at if estimates diﬀer with various demographic and geographic clas-
siﬁcations.
The study adopts a holistic deﬁnition of children's well-being, focusing on their ca-
pabilities as well as access to various goods and services crucial for their survival
and development. Beginning with a dashboard approach (Ravallion, 2011a) where
child deprivations in each of the well-being indicators are reported, we end up ag-
gregating into an index. In the baseline multidimensional child deprivation index,
we include 11 non-monetary indicators grouped under the three traditional dimen-
sions (education, health and living standards) as in Alkire and Santos (2010) but
they are child-speciﬁc except some in living standards. The extended index incor-
porates a monetary child poverty indicator. The assumption is that non-monetary
dimensions can be used to proxy capabilities of children that are actually achieved,
the monetary dimension captures both present and future capabilities. It is derived
from a collective almost ideal demand system (CAIDS) model estimation (Menon
et al., 2017). Based on observation of expenditures on private assignable goods, dis-
tribution factors breaking the intrahousehold resource allocation between children
and adults and adjusting the arising measurement error, we recover the sharing
rule of children. These are ultimately used to identify whether the average child
is expenditure-poor. Deprivations indices are computed following the procedures of
Alkire and Foster (2009, 2011). We use the child as the unit of analyses.
We use Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (ESS) 2014 for the empirical exercise. The
ESS is conducted as part of the LSMS-ISA project by the World Bank and Ethiopia's
Central Statistical Agency (CSA). It contains various child, household and commu-
nity level details that we exploit for meeting the objectives. Besides data issues,
Ethiopia is a good setting for our purpose as it is one of the poorest countries in the
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world with a sizable child population, over 52 percent according to the latest census.
Equivalence scale-based (monetary) child poverty rate at 32.4 percent (CSA et al.,
2015) and multidimensional child deprivation rate at 94 percent (Plavgo et al., 2013)
are higher than monetary and multidimensional rates at the household level, 29.6
percent (MoFED, 2012) and 87 percent (UNDP, 2013) respectively.
We ﬁnd that multidimensional child deprivation is high and varies with children's
gender, their number, family structure and location. The probability of falling
into multidimensional deprivation and the average intensity of it almost monoton-
ically increase with the number of children. Deprivation indices for urban chil-
dren jump in a high magnitude when a monetary indicator is included. Although
multidimensionally-deprived children concentrate more at the lower household/ child
income levels, there is evidence that the monetarily non-poor still host deprived chil-
dren. For instance, depending on the type of monetary poverty measure considered,
10 percent to a quarter of monetarily non-poor children are deprived multidimension-
ally. Regression results, besides conﬁrming the decreasing role of income, indicate
that boys as well as children living in rural areas, single-mother families and large
families are highly likely to be multidimensionally-deprived.
Findings also show that about 60 percent of expenditure-poor under-7 children and
46 percent living in expenditure-poor households are not found to be nutrition-
deprived. About two-thirds of stunted children are not found in the poorest 20%
or 40% of children/households. After controlling for child-, head-, household- and
community-level eﬀects, including shocks and common health eﬀects, we ﬁnd no evi-
dence suggesting that children's nutrition is related to either child- or household-level
expenditure. We also ﬁnd that children living in households with more informational
assets as well as those in educated heads and single-mothers are less stunted.
Evidences raise questions on the use of only monetary information to targeting child
poverty. It may be incorrect to design antipoverty policies with the assumption
that targeting poor households suﬃces in reaching poor or deprived children. The
remainder of the current essay is organized as follows. In the second section, we
discuss the methods. After describing the data in the third section, results are
presented and discussed in section four. The last section concludes.
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2.2. Methods
2.2.1. Dimensions, Indicators, Weights and Deprivation
Thresholds
We use indicators that are speciﬁc to children and those that are common to all
household members but yet having implications to children's well-being. Table 2.1
provides the chosen dimensions, indicators, weights and deprivation thresholds for
constructing child-level multidimensional deprivation index.
The baseline index contains three dimensions that are traditional in the literature:
education, health/nutrition and living standards. In the extended index, we add
monetary poverty as a fourth dimension. Indicators of the living standards dimen-
sion (access to safe water, sanitation, electricity, cooking, housing and asset) are
common to children of all age groups. The health and nutrition dimension contains
common and individual indicators.1 Indicators of the education dimension (current
attendance and formal schooling) refer only to school-age children of 7 to 17 years.
Whether a child is deprived in a certain indicator is decided based primarily on
national and international standards such as national poverty lines for monetary
poverty and WHO standards for nutrition deprivation. Below, we brieﬂy describe
the dimensions and their corresponding indicators.
Education
Education is an important indicator of future capability of children. Two indicators -
compulsory child enrollment and years of schooling - form the education dimension.
Deprivation in child enrollment is measured by presence of any school-age child
not in school. Indicator of school enrollment for children of compulsory school-age,
which is 7 to 17 years in Ethiopia, is widely used in the literature (Alkire and Santos,
2010) and goes in line with national and UNESCO's standards and SDG targets.
If any school-age child has no formal education captures deprivation in child years
1Nutrition data in the ESS are collected for children of ages between 6 and 83 months (under-
seven years and over 6 months). We thus assume that children of other ages are not deprived
in nutrition.
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Table 2.1.: Dimensions, indicators, weights and deprivation thresholds of child
multidimensional deprivation
Dimension (weight) Indicator (weight) Deprived if
D1. Child education (1/3)* D11. Child enrollment (1/6) A school-age child is not currently attending
school.
D12. Child formal education (1/6) A school-age child has no formal education.
D2. Child health and
nutrition (1/3)
D21. Child mortality (1/9) Any child died over the past 2 years.
D22. Child sickness (1/9) A child faced serious illness since two months.
D23. Child stunting (1/9) A 6-83-months-old child (under 7-old) is
stunted (height-for-age z-score < -2) (WHO).
D3. Living standards (1/3)
...child lives in a household with...
D31. Safe water (1/18) Unsafe source of drinking water (WHO).
D32. Sanitation (1/18) Unimproved toilet facility (WHO).
D33. Electricity (1/18) No access to electricity.
D34. Cooking fuel (1/18) No improved cooking fuel (dung, wood or
charcoal).
D35. Floor (1/18) Floor made of natural, non-permanent material.
D36. Information (1/18) No TV/ radio/ mobile phone/ ﬁxed phone.
*D4. Child monetary
poverty (1/4**)
D41. Child is poor (1/4**) Estimated resource share-based per-child
expenditure is below the national poverty line.
Notes: *For the under-7 children sample, the education dimension is represented by an indicator that a child's
biological mother is illiterate. **When child monetary poverty is added as a (fourth) dimension, the weight of
each dimension becomes 1/4 and the corresponding indicators are weighted as multiples of 1/4. Two types of child
monetary poverty are used, one adjusting for children's requirement using age and another without. The adjusted
one modiﬁes the national poverty line (NPL) for children as 0.6*NPL if their age is less than 14.
of schooling. For children under the age of seven, we proxy education by mother's
education.
Health and nutrition
This dimension constitutes three indicators capturing human capital functionings:
any child mortality in the household in the past two years, if a 6-83-month-old
child (hereafter under-7 child) is stunted and if the child faced serious illness. The
ﬁrst two are traditional in the literature while the third incorporates the health
situation of living and older children. Where we are faced with a household with no
6-83-month-old child, we assume they are not deprived in this indicator.
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Standards of living
Seven indicators are included in the standards of living dimension. While the above
dimensions contain a signiﬁcant component of intrahousehold inequality, indicators
in this dimension are similar for all members and capture the household public good
component of well-being. In particular, the living standards indicators measure
deprivations in safe drinking water, electricity, cooking fuel, toilet, housing and
information. The choice of informational assets over all other assets is motivated by
the literature (e.g. Plavgo et al. (2013)), the CRC (Art. 17)) and other international
targets such as in the MDG and SDG.
Monetary child poverty based on resource shares
A version of our child multidimensional deprivation index contains child monetary
poverty as one of the dimensions. While the above non-monetary dimensions can be
used to proxy capabilities of children that are actually achieved, the monetary di-
mension may be considered as capturing both present and future capabilities. Child
poverty is computed from the expenditure share of children in the total household
expenditure after estimating a collective complete Almost Ideal Demand System
(CAIDS) using the identiﬁcation strategy developed by Chavas et al. (2017) and
implemented by Menon et al. (2017). Based on observation of consumption of pri-
vate assignable goods (clothing, education and adult goods), distribution factors
breaking the intrahousehold resource allocation between children and adults as well
as a function adjusting the arising measurement error, we recover the sharing rule
of children. These are ultimately used to identify whether the average child is poor.
The national poverty line aids the identiﬁcation of children as poor. For a technical
detail of this estimation, see Appendix A.2.
Weight of dimensions and indicators
An important step in multidimensional deprivation analysis is weighting of dimen-
sions and indicators. We opt to provide equal weight to all dimensions and each
indicator in a dimension is similarly equally weighted. This is in fact the tradition in
the majority of the literature (Alkire and Santos, 2010; Apablaza and Yalonetzky,
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2012; Roche, 2013; Trani et al., 2013; Singh and Sarkar, 2015). However, subjective
weights could also be assigned (Decancq and Fleurbaey, 2014) but we could not ﬁnd
the required information in the survey we use to implement such weights.
2.2.2. Multidimensional Deprivation Identification and
Aggregation
We adapt the procedures of Alkire and Foster (2009, 2011) for identifying children as
multidimensionally-deprived as for computing relevant indices as well as undertak-
ing sub-group decomposition. Besides the raw (unweighted) deprivation headcount
ratios for each indicator (hj), we compute weighted deprivation count (C), censored
multidimensional deprivation headcount ratio (H), average intensity of deprivations
(A) and the adjusted multidimensional deprivation index (M = H ∗ A). The con-
tributions of indicators, dimensions and population sub-groups such as rural/urban
areas are also calculated. The details on these computations are available in Ap-
pendix A.3.
Multidimensional deprivation (dual) cut-off
A ﬁnal note on multidimensional identiﬁcation is worth highlighting. In the Alkire-
Foster framework, someone is identiﬁed as multidimensionally-deprived if she is
deprived in several indicators at the same time. This identiﬁcation of the poor is
done in two cut-oﬀs: deprivation cut-oﬀ that shows whether someone is deprived in
a certain indicator or not, and a deprivation cut-oﬀ (equivalent to the poverty line
in the monetary approach) that helps identify those deprived multidimensionally.
In general, three identiﬁcation criteria are available in the literature: the union,
the intersection and intermediate (dual cut-oﬀ) approaches. According to the union
approach, someone is said to be multidimensionally-deprived if there is at least
one dimension in which the person is deprived. However, this approach has the
weakness that when the number of dimensions is large, it often identiﬁes most of
the population as being poor. For instance, deprivation in a single dimension may
imply something else other than poverty and hence the approach is not appropriate
in all circumstances (Alkire and Foster, 2011). On the other extreme, the intersection
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approach identiﬁes someone as multidimensionally-deprived only if she is deprived
in all dimensions. This approach, however, certainly misses people who experience
extensive, but not universal, deprivation like those with insuﬃciency in every other
dimension who happen to be healthy (Alkire and Foster, 2009).
An alternative and more reasonable approach is to base identiﬁcation on a cut-oﬀ
lying somewhere between those extremes - the intermediate or dual cut-oﬀ approach
which is used in the AF framework. Accordingly, an individual is identiﬁed as
multidimensionally-deprived if the weighted count (or number) of dimensions in
which the person is deprived is at least above some minimum cut-oﬀ number of
dimensions (k). The dual cut-oﬀ approach is more inclusive than the extremes union
and intersection approaches. In short, if all dimensions d are equally weighted, the
value of k varies from 1 to d. When k = 1, the identiﬁcation refers to the union
approach; when k = d, it is the intersection approach. In the dual cut-oﬀ approach,
other k values lying between the extremes (1 < k < d) can be chosen.
2.3. The Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data for the study come from Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (ESS) collected jointly
by the World Bank and the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSA) as part of
the Living Standard Measurement Study-Integrated Surveys of Agriculture (LSMS-
ISA). ESS is a panel survey with three waves to date (2011/12, 2013/14 and 2015/16).
While the sample design of the ﬁrst wave provides representative estimates for rural-
area and small-town households, subsequent waves include medium and large towns
and cities so that they have become nationally-representative. It uses a stratiﬁed,
two-stage design where regions of Ethiopia serve as the strata. The ﬁrst stage in-
volves the selection of primary sampling units (or enumeration areas) using simple
random sampling. The second stage of sampling entails the selection of households.
ESS contains household-level data on a range of modules including expenditure,
assets, shocks, non-farm enterprises, credit and farm production. Individual data
on demographics, education, health, some expenditure items, and time use are also
collected. Moreover, community-level data as well as data on prices from local
markets are available. However, in addition to being a rural-only survey, the 2011/12
wave lacks expenditure data on education, health, housing and food away from
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home. Lack of price data for assignable clothing and other goods such as education
and personal care also forced us to exclude the 2015/16 wave. This study, therefore,
employs the 2013/14 wave. A total of 23,785 individuals, of whom 11,343 are children
under 18, living in 5,262 households were interviewed. The chosen sample for this
study is 9,345 children who live with married male-headed (two-parent) and single
female-headed (single-mother) households. These two sub-samples are considered
to make a comparative analysis of child well-being over parental gender and family
structure. In fact, the left out categories (married female-headed and single-father)
are very negligible.
In the demand system estimation used for recovering children's expenditure shares
and hence monetary poverty, we aggregate the various non-durable expenditure
items into four expenditure groups: food at home and alcohol, clothing, household
utilities and energy, and other goods. Exclusive/assignable consumption is based
on a host of non-durable expenditure items. Clothing and footwear expenditures,
collected at male, female, girl and boy levels as well as education expenditures,
collected at individual level, are clearly assignable. Further, we assign expenditures
on alcoholic drinks, stimulants (chat/khat and cigarettes) and some personal care
items to adults. Prices data come in various forms including unit values for food
items, local market prices for the majority of non-food items and CSA's average
retail prices for others.
Data on non-monetary deprivations are obtained from the various other modules of
the ESS. Indicators of the child education dimension are retrieved from the education
section which collected information at each individual level. For the child health and
nutrition dimension, information from the health section of the survey is used which
once again collects data at individual level although anthropometric measures are
obtained for children between 6 and 59 months (under 7 years). Living standards
indicators at the household level are gathered from the housing and assets sections
of ESS.
Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics of our sub-sample in selected variables at
child, household and community levels. While half of the children are girls, a little
more than that engage in some form of labor activity. Three-quarters pf children
live with working parents while a quarter have a single-mother. Over half of their
parents are illiterate and only 10 percent make it to high school or above. Roughly
equally a ﬁfth of the children fall in each of the ﬁve relative poverty quintiles of
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Table 2.2.: Descriptive statistics of selected variables: ESS 2013/14 (N = 9345)
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estimated child expenditures. One child in ﬁve live in households reporting to have
faced economic shocks in terms of either rise or fall of food prices and 7 percent
in communities who faced an epidemic disease. Location-wise, the majority (77
percent) live in rural areas while about a ﬁfth come from each of Amhara, Oromia
and other small regions except Addis Ababa (3 percent), SNNP (a quarter) and
Tigray (11 percent).
2.4. Results
In this section, we ﬁrst present results on the types of children's monetary and
non-monetary deprivations. Once deprivations are weighted, counted and poverty
cut-oﬀs are decided, the multidimensional deprivation situation of children with and
without intrahousehold resource allocation is analyzed. The link between children's
monetary, nutrition and multidimensional deprivation is then dealt with. Concen-
tration curves and regression models support the analyses.
2.4.1. Children’s Monetary and Non-monetary Raw Deprivations
Table 2.3 provides average raw (unweighted) child deprivation rates in selected indi-
cators for the whole sample and by gender, family structure and location. The upper
panel summarizes deprivation rates in child-speciﬁc, non-monetary indicators (ed-
ucation, health and nutrition). We ﬁnd substantial deprivation of children's future
development in education, health and nutrition. There also exist signiﬁcant gaps in
deprivations when disaggregated by children's sex (except in health and education),
family type and residence where girls and children living with single-mother families
and in urban areas are better oﬀ compared to boys and those living with male-headed
families and in rural areas. In particular, 7 percent of school-age children are not
attending school and 14 percent have no formal education. However, children seem
to be less deprived of formal education when living in single-mother families and
urban areas. Although lower rates of child mortality are reported generally within
two years, rates are higher among single-mothers and rural dwellers. Non-negligible
rates of child sickness two months from survey (14 percent) and any stunted child
(11 percent) are also reported.
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Table 2.3.: Average raw (unweighted) child deprivation rates (N = 9345)
Deprivation variable
Whole
sample
Sex Family type Rural/urban
Girls Boys Single-
mother
Male-
headed
Rural Urban
Non-monetary: child-speciﬁc
Child not enrolled 0.07 0.06** 0.08 0.10*** 0.06 0.07 0.06
Child has no formal education 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.16*** 0.05
Child mortality 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08*** 0.02 0.03*** 0.01
Child sickness 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12* 0.14 0.14 0.16
Child stunting 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.06*** 0.12 0.12*** 0.07
Non-monetary: household-level
No safe water 0.35 0.33*** 0.37 0.26*** 0.36 0.40*** 0.04
Poor sanitation 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.97*** 0.83
No electricity 0.78 0.76*** 0.80 0.63*** 0.80 0.89*** 0.13
Poor cooking fuel 0.98 0.98** 0.98 0.95*** 0.98 1.00*** 0.86
Poor ﬂoor 0.92 0.91*** 0.93 0.90* 0.92 0.97*** 0.63
No information source 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.49* 0.42 0.49*** 0.10
Monetary poverty
Child poverty rate 0.86 0.83*** 0.89 0.78*** 0.88 0.90*** 0.67
Adjusted child poverty rate 0.68 0.63** 0.73 0.57*** 0.69 0.72*** 0.45
Household poverty rate 0.72 0.71 0.73 0.65** 0.73 0.77*** 0.40
Notes: *, ** and *** imply mean diﬀerence (boy - girl, single-mother - male-headed and rural - urban) is statistically
signiﬁcant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The monetary poverty line used is the national poverty line (NPL)
provided by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED, 2012) modiﬁed to take into account
inﬂation. The adjusted child monetary poverty modiﬁes the NPL for children as 0.6*NPL for those aged less than
14 years. All estimates are weighted to make them representative of the corresponding population.
Children also live in households that are highly deprived of basic living standards
as reported at the middle panel of Table 2.3. In fact, the largest rates of children's
deprivations are associated with living standards. These range from 35 percent of not
having access to safe water to 98 percent of use of health-threatening cooking items;
and all deprivations are worse in rural than urban areas. Others include deprivations
in sanitation facilities (95 percent), housing in terms of ﬂoor (92 percent), access to
electricity (78 percent) and access to information sources (43 percent).
The bottom three rows of Table 2.3 provide monetary poverty rates. The poverty
line used is the (oﬃcial) national poverty line (NPL) provided by Ethiopia's Ministry
of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED, 2012) and modiﬁed to take into
account inﬂation. The adjusted child monetary poverty modiﬁes this poverty line
for children as 0.6*NPL for those aged less than 14 years. In addition to the poverty
rates from our new approach of using estimated sharing rules, the one based on the
50
2.4 Results
traditional approach of adult-equivalents (household level) is reported for compari-
son. We ﬁnd high monetary child poverty rates. For the whole sample, child poverty
headcount rate stands at 86 percent. Boys are poorer than girls, as are children in
male-headed families and rural areas relative to their counterparts in single-mother
and urban areas. If intrahousehold resource allocation was not considered, poverty
rate would be lower at 72 percent. This is in line with the collective household
model's empirical evidence elsewhere in Africa that the unitary model understates
poverty (Dunbar et al., 2013; Bargain et al., 2014, 2018). As expected, adjusting
the poverty line for children under the age of 14 lowers the poverty situation.
The estimates above are not weighted and simply show the prevalence of child de-
privations in their corresponding sectors. A policymaker interested in these separate
issues may make use of them in the design of anti-poverty or anti-deprivation in-
terventions. This is what is known in the literature as the dashboard approach
(Ravallion, 2011b). If interest lies in the overall status of child deprivation, one
needs to compute the (weighted) multidimensional measure and shares of each of
the previous deprivations in the aggregate measure can also be analyzed.
2.4.2. Multidimensional Child Deprivation and Intrahousehold
Resource Allocation
Traditional measures of multidimensional deprivation do not usually contain a mon-
etary component. Here, in addition to the widely-used index, we estimate two more
indices which include a monetary dimension and consider intrahousehold resource
allocation. After counting the number of deprivations encountered by children, we
aggregate into multidimensional deprivation incidence and intensity. To look more
into where the deprivation is concentrated, contributions to the total multidimen-
sional child deprivation of indicators and dimensions as well as select locations and
demographic groups are also presented.
2.4.2.1. Weighted Count of Children’s Deprivations
Table 2.4 summarizes weighted count of deprivations of children in three cases for
the whole sample and various sub-groups. When a monetary dimension does not
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Table 2.4.: Weighted count of children's deprivations by gender, family type and
location
Deprivation count
Whole
sample
Children's gender Family type Rural/urban
Girls Boys Single-
mother
Male-
headed
Rural Urban
Without monetary dimension 0.31 0.31*** 0.32 0.28*** 0.32 0.33*** 0.20
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
With monetary dimension:
(a) With child poverty 0.45 0.44*** 0.46 0.41*** 0.46 0.47*** 0.31
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010)
(b) With adjusted child poverty 0.40 0.39*** 0.42 0.36*** 0.41 0.43*** 0.26
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
Notes: *, ** and *** imply the mean diﬀerence (boy - girl, single-mother - male-headed and rural - urban) is
statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. The adjusted
monetary child poverty modiﬁes the national poverty line (NPL) for children as 0.6*NPL if age is less than 14. All
estimates are weighted to make them representative of the corresponding population.
enter the index, the average weighted child deprivation count is computed as 0.31
for the whole sample. The ﬁgure is slightly higher for boys and children in male-
headed parents (0.32 in each) as well as those in rural areas (0.33). What happens
if one adds a dimension that measures child monetary poverty? In one case, this
dimension refers to whether the average child is poor monetarily with no adjustment
in the poverty line while in the other case the poverty line is adjusted to the needs
of children using their age. Recall that we make use of the national poverty line
(NPL) provided by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED,
2012) modiﬁed to take into account inﬂation so that our adjusted child monetary
poverty modiﬁes NPL for children as 0.6*NPL for those aged less than 14 years.2
However, the addition of a monetary poverty dimension worsens the situation of
children's multiple deprivations. For the whole sample, for example, the average
weighted count of deprivations rises to 0.45 and to 0.40 in the adjusted case. Once
again, girls and children living with single-mothers and in urban areas are less likely
to be poor.
How does children's multiple deprivation count change with family size and income
at household and child levels? Figure 2.1 depicts weighted child deprivation counts
2The reason for reporting the one with no adjustment of the poverty line to children is in part due
to the fact that children's expenditures here are estimated with consideration of intrahousehold
resource allocation using a function capturing child-adult diﬀerences. Recall that the monetary
child poverty dimension is added means an equal weight of 0.25 for the four dimensions and
their corresponding indicators are equally-weighted.
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Figure 2.1.: Weighted child deprivation counts over the number of children and
expenditure
Note: 95% conﬁdence intervals are shaded. The adjusted monetary child poverty modiﬁes the national poverty
line (NPL) for children as 0.6*NPL if age is less than 14.
over the number of children, household per-capita expenditure (adult-equivalent)
and per-child expenditure. As expected, we generally count more children deprived
in multiple indicators with an increase in the number of children with a slight fall
at higher sizes. On the other hand, multiple deprivations generally decrease with
expenditures. However, trends in these relationships slightly vary depending on the
inclusion of a monetary poverty dimension/indicator in the deprivations.
2.4.2.2. Multidimensional Child Deprivation
We now add the second cut-oﬀ to the indicator-speciﬁc cut-oﬀs in order to identify
a child as multiply-deprived. This, in our case, refers to in how many weighted in-
dicators a child should be deprived to be deemed multidimensionally-deprived. The
two extreme cut-oﬀs, k ∼= 0 or the union approach and k ∼= 1 or the intersection
approach, identify almost all and no children as multidimensionally-deprived respec-
tively. In order to see the sensitivity of multidimensional deprivation to the choice
of a poverty line, we opt to report six intermediate cut-oﬀs representing deprivations
in at least 10%, 25%, 33%, 50% and 67% of weighted count of indicators. Table 2.5
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provides the summary of multidimensional deprivation indices computed based on
each of these.
Multidimensional deprivation headcount ratio (H) measures the proportion of chil-
dren deprived in at least a given count (k) of weighted dimensions. In the baseline
index, which excludes a monetary dimension, our estimates show H reaches as high
as 98 percent when k = 0.10 and only 7 percent when k = 0.50 while no child is
multidimensionally-deprived at k = 0.67. At the widely-used intermediate line of
k = 0.33, multidimensional deprivation headcount rate stands at 47 percent. This
contrasts with the monetary headcount rate of 86 percent and 68 percent when the
oﬃcial poverty line is adjusted for children. The average intensity of simultaneous
deprivations suﬀered by poor children (A) is estimated as 0.32 at a 0.10 cut-oﬀ and
0.79 at the 0.67 line. Adjusting H by A gives the adjusted multidimensional depri-
vation index (M) which ranges between 31 percent and 0 percent with those two
cut-oﬀs respectively. At the popular line of k = 0.33, average intensity is 0.41 and
adjusted multidimensional index is 20 percent.
How do the results using the baseline index change with an inclusion of a mone-
tary dimension (an indicator of intrahousehold resource allocation)? The monetary
dimension refers to whether a child is poor as computed from children's estimated
sharing rule and compared to an oﬃcial poverty line. Two more indices are then
computed: one using the oﬃcial adult-equivalent poverty line and the other using
an adjusted one to children's needs. To begin with, no diﬀerences in H among the
three indices are seen at the lowest and highest multidimensional cut-oﬀs considered
above. The diﬀerences in A and M at these cut-oﬀs are moderate. However, at low
and middle cut-oﬀs, the eﬀects of the inclusion of a child monetary poverty indicator
in the index seem to be large. For instance at k = 0.33, H almost doubles to 87
percent with the unadjusted case and becomes 72 percent with the adjusted one.
This, coupled with a slight jump in A, makes M to more than double to 43 percent
in the unadjusted and to 35 percent in the adjusted case.
We also decompose the multidimensional deprivation measures by children's gender,
family type, number of children and residence (see Table 2.6). Although boys (49
percent) are likely to be more multidimensionally-deprived (H) than girls (45 per-
cent), this diﬀerence seems to vanish when the intensity of deprivation is accounted
for (M) (19 versus 20 percent). On the other hand, boy-girl gap in multidimensional
deprivation remains when indices include a monetary dimension. Children living in
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Table 2.5.: Estimates of multidimensional child poverty with intrahousehold re-
source allocation
Poverty
measure
k = 0.10 k = 0.25 k = 0.33 k = 0.50 k = 0.67
Without monetary poverty (3 dimensions)
H 0.98
(0.004)
0.69
(0.018)
0.47
(0.016)
0.07
(0.008)
0.00
(0.000)
A 0.32
(0.004)
0.37
(0.002)
0.41
(0.002)
0.53
(0.003)
0.79
(0.008)
M 0.31
(0.004)
0.25
(0.007)
0.20
(0.007)
0.04
(0.004)
0.00
(0.000)
With monetary child poverty (4 dimensions)
H 0.98
(0.003)
0.91
(0.008)
0.87
(0.010)
0.39
(0.016)
0.01
(0.001)
A 0.46
(0.004)
0.48
(0.003)
0.49
(0.003)
0.57
(0.002)
0.72
(0.005)
M 0.45
(0.005)
0.44
(0.006)
0.43
(0.006)
0.22
(0.009)
0.00
(0.001)
With adjusted monetary child poverty (4 dimensions)
H 0.97
(0.005)
0.79
(0.005)
0.72
(0.010)
0.32
(0.005)
0.01
(0.001)
A 0.42
(0.006)
0.47
(0.008)
0.49
(0.003)
0.57
(0.004)
0.72
(0.004)
M 0.40
(0.007)
0.37
(0.008)
0.35
(0.009)
0.18
(0.010)
0.00
(0.001)
Notes: k = poverty cut-oﬀ. H = multidimensional headcount ratio. A = average intensity of deprivation among
the poor. M = multidimensional deprivation index. Standard errors in parentheses. The adjusted monetary child
poverty modiﬁes the national poverty line (NPL) for children as 0.6*NPL if age is less than 14. All estimates are
weighted to make them representative of the corresponding population.
families with a male head are also found to have higher chance of being multiply-poor
despite the measure being adjusted for intensity or including a monetary dimension.
As expected, the probability of falling into multidimensional deprivation and the
average intensity of it almost monotonically increase when the number of children
increases. For example in the baseline index excluding monetary dimension, a child
living in a large family (over four children) is more probable to fall in multidimen-
sional deprivation by 19 percentage points compared to that in a one-child family.
In the other two indices, this gap only slightly falls to 15 and 13 percentage points.
The spatial inequality is also high. A very large disparity is noticeable between
children living in rural areas and their urban counterparts. Very importantly, in
urban areas the estimates show a large jump from the baseline index to those indices
that include monetary poverty. This signals that a multidimensional deprivation
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Table 2.6.: Decomposition of multidimensional child deprivation by gender, family
type, number of children and location
Without monetary pov. With monetary pov. With adj. monetary pov.
H A M H A M H A M
Girls 0.45 0.42 0.19 0.87 0.47 0.41 0.68 0.49 0.33
Boys 0.49 0.41 0.20 0.90 0.48 0.44 0.77 0.49 0.38
Single-mother 0.43 0.42 0.18 0.79 0.49 0.39 0.64 0.48 0.31
Male-headed 0.48 0.42 0.20 0.88 0.49 0.43 0.89 0.40 0.36
One child 0.40 0.40 0.16 0.68 0.47 0.32 0.58 0.47 0.27
Two children 0.40 0.43 0.17 0.78 0.49 0.38 0.60 0.47 0.28
Three children 0.48 0.42 0.20 0.86 0.50 0.43 0.71 0.48 0.34
Four children 0.49 0.45 0.22 0.88 0.49 0.43 0.72 0.49 0.35
> Four children 0.50 0.74 0.37 0.94 0.50 0.47 0.81 0.49 0.40
Rural 0.53 0.42 0.22 0.92 0.50 0.46 0.77 0.49 0.38
Small town 0.21 0.43 0.09 0.76 0.43 0.33 0.54 0.44 0.24
Medium & large town 0.10 0.40 0.04 0.54 0.41 0.22 0.36 0.42 0.15
Addis Ababa 0.02 0.50 0.01 0.36 0.39 0.14 0.21 0.38 0.08
Amhara 0.55 0.42 0.23 0.88 0.50 0.44 0.76 0.50 0.38
Oromia 0.45 0.42 0.19 0.88 0.49 0.43 0.70 0.49 0.34
SNNP 0.48 0.42 0.20 0.93 0.48 0.45 0.80 0.49 0.39
Tigray 0.41 0.39 0.16 0.81 0.48 0.39 0.62 0.47 0.29
Other regions 0.49 0.41 0.20 0.88 0.49 0.43 0.72 0.47 0.34
Overall 0.47 0.41 0.20 0.87 0.49 0.43 0.72 0.49 0.34
Notes: H = multidimensional headcount ratio. A = average intensity of deprivation by the poor. M = multidi-
mensional deprivation index. The estimates here are based on a poverty cut-oﬀ k = 0.33. The adjusted monetary
child poverty modiﬁes the national poverty line (NPL) for children as 0.6*NPL when their age is less than 14. All
estimates are weighted to make them representative of the corresponding population.
measure of the Alkire and Santos (2010) family excluding monetary variables is less
useful for identiﬁcation and hence targeting the urban poor in developing countries.
To further disentangle the spatial inequality in multidimensional child poverty in
Ethiopia, we disaggregate estimates by region and map them (see Figure 2.2). Inline
with the rural-urban divide, the capital city, Addis Ababa, has the smallest incidence
even after adjusting for average intensity and adding a monetary dimension to the
index. Children in Tigray region follow those in Addis Ababa at a distant second.
On the other worst extreme, children in Amhara region are the most likely to be
multidimensionally-deprived when excluding the monetary dimension, followed by
those in SNNP. These regions switch positions in indices that include a monetary
child resource-sharing dimension.
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Figure 2.2.: Decomposition of multidimensional child deprivation by region
Notes: H = multidimensional headcount ratio. M = multidimensional deprivation index. Standard errors in
parentheses. The adjusted monetary child poverty modiﬁes the national poverty line (NPL) for children as 0.6*NPL
if age is less than 14. All estimates are weighted to make them representative of the corresponding population.
Estimates are representative only for Addis Ababa, Amhara, Oromia, SNNP and Tigray.
2.4.2.3. Concentration of Multidimensional Child Deprivation
An important step in multidimensional deprivation analysis is to compute the con-
tribution to poverty of a certain population sub-group and an indicator/dimension.
This has the obvious advantage of aiding policies that aim at its reduction.
The upper panel of Figure 2.3 summarizes the contribution to the overall multidi-
mensional child deprivation of certain demographic sub-groups. Despite an equal
representation in the sample, the contribution of boys (52.5 percent) is slightly
higher than that of girls (47.5 percent) with slight variations when monetary indica-
tors are taken into account. And due to their dominant population, children living
in male-headed families have a share of about 90 percent in all indices. Children in
large families have obviously a large burden in bad circumstances and the clockwise
increment in the contribution of children to poverty in one-child to over-four-child
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Figure 2.3.: Spatial contribution to the overall multidimensional child deprivation
index (M)
Notes: The adjusted monetary child poverty modiﬁes the national poverty line (NPL) for children as 0.6*NPL if
age is less than 14. All estimates are weighted to make them representative of the corresponding population.
families conﬁrms this fact. The lower panel of Figure 2.3 provides evidence on spa-
tial disparity. Multidimensional child deprivation is a rural problem with a share
of 96 percent, the remaining being of urban children. In fact, this share slightly
drops to 92 percent when a monetary child poverty enters. The three most popu-
lous regions of the country, Oromia, Amhara and SNNP, jointly contribute almost
90 percent, with 40 percent and 25 percent coming from Oromia and Amhara. As
expected children in Addis Ababa have the smallest share. Adding an indicator of
a monetary intrahousehold resource allocation does not seem to bring a diﬀerence
in this regard.
Figure 2.4 depicts the contribution of indicators (left panel) and dimensions (right
panel) to the overall (adjusted) multidimensional child deprivation index in the three
cases. When a monetary dimension is not included, the main sources of deprivation
seem to be household living standards deprivations contributing almost 70 percent
to the aggregate index. This is constituted to a large extent by deprivations in
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Figure 2.4.: Contribution to multidimensional child deprivation of indicators and
dimensions
Notes: The monetary dimension's indicator is omitted from the left panel for scale reasons and, more importantly,
to show the eﬀect of its inclusion on other indicators. The adjusted monetary child poverty modiﬁes the national
poverty line (NPL) for children as 0.6*NPL if age is less than 14. All estimates are weighted to make them
representative of the corresponding population.
sanitation, electricity, cooking fuel and housing (ﬂoor). Child level deprivations in
receiving formal education and nutritious food also hold important shares.
When the multidimensional deprivation index accommodates a monetary child poverty
dimension, the share of the above non-monetary dimensions signiﬁcantly shrinks.
Monetary poverty, when included, contributes about half of the multiple depriva-
tions faced by children irrespective of the poverty line being adjusted. This is fol-
lowed by a 40 percent share by household living standards and about 5 percent by
each of child education and health dimensions. The ﬁnding of such higher contribu-
tions to multiple child deprivation is consistent with previous evidence in Ethiopia
(Plavgo et al., 2013).
2.4.3. Overlaps between Children’s Monetary Poverty,
Undernutrition and Multidimensional Deprivation
Use of child anthropometric information is one of the ways to gauge child welfare.
However, the overlap between monetary poverty and undernutrition is still among
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the unsettled research agenda (Brown et al., 2017, 2018). Are undernourished chil-
dren also monetarily-poor? Are all monetarily non-poor children also not undernour-
ished? Yet, another important issue is the link between being multidimensionally-
deprived and being monetarily-poor. What portion of children identiﬁed monetarily-
poor is also multidimensionally-deprived? This section adds to this line of empirical
evidence for under-7-years-old children.3 For that purpose, we use simple overlap
tabulations, expenditure quintile-based disaggregations, concentration curves and
regressions.
Overall, among children whose nutritional information is available, a ﬁfth to a quar-
ter are found to be disadvantaged simultaneously in all those three measures of child
well-being: monetarily poor (themselves or their households), undernourished and
deprived multidimensionally (see Table 2.7).
Undernutrition - monetary poverty overlap
Let us ﬁrst see the monetary poverty-undernutrition nexus among under-7 children.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.7 summarize the overlap between children's status in
terms of monetary poverty and stunting. Two child expenditure- and one house-
hold expenditure-based monetary poverty measures are used. Estimates show that
depending on the type of monetary poverty measure used, in only about 20 to 30
percent of the cases an under-7 stunted child is also poor monetarily. The match
in poverty status (poor/deprived in both or non-poor/non-deprived in both) is less
than 50 percent. More importantly, children are stunted although they non-poor
monetarily (3 percent, rising to 10 percent when using child-adjusted poverty line)
and in 9 percent of non-poor households there are stunted children. On the ﬂip side,
unlike the expectation, about 60 percent of expenditure-poor under-7 children are
not found to be nutrition-deprived. And in 46 percent of expenditure-poor house-
holds, a child is not nutrition-deprived.
We further disentangle this issue using relative monetary poverty measures (expendi-
ture quintiles) and disaggregating by population sub-groups (see columns 1 through
5 of Table 2.8). For the whole sample, about two-thirds of stunted children are not
found in the poorest 20% or 40% of children/households. The ﬁndings contrast with
3As we cannot expect all under-7 children to be in school in Ethiopia, the education dimension
in the multidimensional deprivation indicator is proxied by if the child's mother is illiterate.
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Table 2.7.: Overlap between children's monetary poverty, undernutrition and mul-
tidimensional deprivation
Child stunting Multidimensional child
deprivation
Deprived Not deprived Deprived Not deprived
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary child poverty
Poor 0.29 (0.011) 0.59 (0.011) 0.70 (0.010) 0.17 (0.009)
Non-poor 0.03 (0.004) 0.09 (0.006) 0.08 (0.006) 0.05 (0.004)
Match in status* 0.38 0.75
Poor in the three 0.27 (0.010)
Adj. monetary child poverty
Poor 0.21 (0.009) 0.44 (0.011) 0.54 (0.012) 0.12 (0.007)
Non-poor 0.10 (0.007) 0.24 (0.010) 0.24 (0.010) 0.11 (0.007)
Match in status* 0.45 0.65
Poor in the three 0.20 (0.009)
Monetary household poverty
Poor 0.23 (0.010) 0.46 (0.012) 0.58 (0.012) 0.10 (0.007)
Non-poor 0.09 (0.006) 0.23 (0.010) 0.19 (0.009) 0.12 (0.007)
Match in status* 0.46 0.70
Poor in the three 0.22 (0.010)
Notes: Multidimensional deprivation status here is based on non-monetary dimensions and a cut-oﬀ k = 0.33.
*Match in status implies the proportion of children with similar status in two measures (poor & deprived or non-
poor/non-deprived). The adjusted monetary child poverty modiﬁes the national poverty line (NPL) as 0.6*NPL
since all children here are under-7s. All estimates are weighted to make them representative of the corresponding
population. Standard errors in parentheses.
a very recent ﬁnding for Africa by Brown et al. (2017) who do not ﬁnd three-quarters
and half of undernourished children in the poorest 20% and 40% of households re-
spectively. While boys and girls do not diﬀer, rural children are found to be more
undernourished than their urban counterparts; nonetheless, only few rural-urban
child stunting disparities over the income distributions are statistically signiﬁcant.
One can also notice that there is only a slight diﬀerence in the prevalence of stunting
at the bottom (poorest) 20% and the top (richest) 20% although the concentration
seems more to be seen at the bottom.
The concentration information is visually observed from the concentration curves
of child stunting in Figure 2.5 which plot the cumulative share of stunted children
against expenditure percentiles (of children on the left and of the household on
the right) ranked from the poorest up. The greater the degree of concavity, or
the further away the concentration curve from the 45-degree line, the more stunted
children tend to concentrate in the poorer strata of child/household expenditure.
The concentration curves do not seem to provide much information on the at this
level. But, comparing the left and right curves for stunting, we notice that the
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Table 2.8.: Overlap between children's monetary poverty, undernutrition and mul-
tidimensional deprivation over expenditure quintiles and by their gender and res-
idence type
Child is stunted Child is multidimensionally-deprived
All Girls Boys Rural Urban All Girls Boys Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Quintiles based on estimated per-child expenditure
Poorest 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.37** 0.19 0.86 0.91** 0.83 0.91*** 0.40
Poor 0.33 0.30 0.36 0.34 0.26 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.86*** 0.49
Middle 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.83*** 0.37
Rich 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.33** 0.20 0.76 0.73 0.79 0.83*** 0.35
Richest 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.29* 0.21 0.62 0.59* 0.67 0.78*** 0.21
Quintiles based on household expenditure (adult-equivalent)
Poorest 0.36 0.32 0.40 0.37 0.26 0.91 0.91 0.87 0.92*** 0.59
Poor 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88** 0.70
Middle 0.35 0.37 0.33 0.36* 0.23 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.89*** 0.48
Rich 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.32** 0.20 0.70 0.67 0.71 0.79*** 0.24
Richest 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.22 0.60 0.57 0.62 0.76*** 0.24
Overall 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.33*** 0.22 0.78 0.77 0.79 0.85*** 0.33
Notes: *, ** and *** imply mean diﬀerence (boy-girl and rural-urban) is statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5% and
1% levels respectively. Multidimensional deprivation status here is based on non-monetary dimensions and a cut-oﬀ
k = 0.33. All estimates are weighted to make them representative of the corresponding population. All estimates
are weighted to make them representative of the corresponding population.
concentration of under-7 children at the lower income levels is visible only when
child-level expenditures are used. As also shown in Figure A.3 of the Appendix, the
concentration of stunting varies with gender, family type and location across the
income distributions. For example, more stunted boys than girls concentrate in the
lower income tiers.
We ﬁnally run two augmented regressions of child stunting, each on child-level and
household-level expenditure quintile dummies and other covariates. We control for
child-, head-, household- and community-level eﬀects including economic and natu-
ral shocks, common health eﬀects and spatial diﬀerences which may inﬂuence chil-
dren's nutritional outcomes. Results are summarized in Table A.5 of the Appendix
(columns 3 and 4). We ﬁnd no evidence suggesting that children's nutrition is re-
lated to either child- or household-level expenditure. This ﬁnding in fact is not
uncommon. In particular, we share similar conclusion with Brown et al. (2017) who
conclude that it is wrong to design antipoverty policies with the assumption that
targeting poor households suﬃces in reaching poor individuals such as children.
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Figure 2.5.: Concentration curves for stunted and multidimensionally-deprived
children over child- and household-level expenditures
Note: Multidimensional deprivation status here is based on non-monetary dimensions and a cut-oﬀ at k = 0.33.
All estimates are weighted to make them representative of the corresponding population. All curves consider 95%
conﬁdence intervals (not shown).
Our results also lend support to studies which ﬁnd no impact of Ethiopia's Produc-
tive Safety Net Program on children's nutritional outcomes and suggest 'cash plus'
programs where the plus may include packages on proving child nutrition informa-
tion to parents (Berhane et al., 2017). This is also veriﬁed by the signiﬁcance of the
variable measuring informational assets where children in households lacking such
assets have higher probabilities of being stunted. Moreover, children living with
educated heads as well as single-mothers are less stunted.
Multidimensional deprivation - monetary poverty overlap
Let us now shift attention to the monetary poverty-multidimensional deprivation
nexus. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.7 summarize this overlap (this time multidimen-
sional index does not include a monetary dimension and child education is proxied
by mother's education). Generally, there is a 75 percent match in status in which 70
percent of expenditure-poor children are also multidimensionally-deprived, falling to
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54 percent with adjusted monetary poverty and 58 percent with household level mon-
etary poverty. Bruck and Kebede (2013) ﬁnd that 30 percent of households in rural
Ethiopia were both consumption-poor and multidimensionally-deprived in 2009. We
also ﬁnd that depending on the type of monetary poverty measure considered, 10
percent to a quarter of monetarily non-poor children are deprived multidimension-
ally, once again questioning the use of only monetary information to targeting child
well-being.
Columns 6 through 10 of Table 2.8 provide further evidence on the monetary poverty-
multidimensional deprivation link expenditure quintiles and give disaggregated re-
sults by child gender and location. An immediate ﬁnding is that the incidence of
multidimensional child poverty falls with both child- and household-level expendi-
ture, from 90 percent to 60 percent. However, although only few (10 to 15 percent)
of the bottom 20% not found to be multidimensionally-deprived, 40 percent of the
top 20% are deprived. Bruck and Kebede (2013) estimate the the bottom level as 40
percent at household level for rural Ethiopia in 2009. Children in rural area tend to
signiﬁcantly have higher multidimensional deprivation probabilities over the income
distributions.
Looking at the concave concentration curves for multiply-deprived children ranked
by child- and household-level expenditures also supports the above evidence that
lower income tiers are homes to child deprivations (see Figure 2.5). Results also hold
when we use an augmented regression to control for other factors inﬂuencing mul-
tidimensional child deprivation (see columns 5 to 8 of Table A.5 in the Appendix).
Besides income variables, children living in urban areas, single-mother families as
well as in educated household heads are found to be less deprived multidimension-
ally. We also conﬁrm that girls are less probable to be multidimensionally-deprived
than boys but only if a monetary dimension is included. And as expected, multidi-
mensional child deprivation increases with the number of children.
2.5. Conclusions
Child well-being is multidimensional but the overlap between monetary and non-
monetary components is far from being obvious. We analyze children's well-being in
terms of multidimensional deprivation, monetary poverty and undernutrition. After
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identifying children as poor using their resource shares, we compute an alternative
version of the traditional multidimensional child deprivation index by including a
monetary dimension. We also look at the overlaps between the three alternative
measures of child well-being: Are all monetarily non-poor children also not under-
nourished? Do non-poor households host stunted children? What portion of chil-
dren identiﬁed monetarily-poor is also multidimensionally-deprived? The empirical
exercise uses the 2013/14 Ethiopian LSMS data.
We ﬁnd that multidimensional child deprivation is high and varies with children's
gender and number as well as family structure and location they live in. The prob-
ability of falling into multidimensional deprivation and the average intensity of it
almost monotonically increase with the number of children. Deprivation indices
for urban children jump in values when a monetary indicator is included. Although
multidimensionally-deprived children concentrate more at the lower household/ child
income levels, there is also evidence that the monetarily non-poor still host deprived
children. For instance, depending on the type of monetary poverty measure consid-
ered, 10 percent to a quarter of monetarily non-poor children are deprived multidi-
mensionally. Regression results indicate that, besides conﬁrming the role of income,
boys as well as children living in rural areas, single-mother families and large families
are highly likely to be multidimensionally-deprived.
We also estimate that about 60 percent of expenditure-poor under-7 children and
46 percent living in expenditure-poor households are not found to be nutrition-
deprived. And about two-thirds of stunted children are not found in the poorest
20% or 40% of children/households. After controlling for child-, head-, household-
and community-level eﬀects, including shocks and common health eﬀects, we ﬁnd no
evidence suggesting that children's nutrition is related to either child- or household-
level expenditure. We also ﬁnd that children living in households with more infor-
mational assets as well as those living with educated heads and single-mothers are
less stunted.
Our ﬁndings question the use of only monetary information to targeting and formu-
lating welfare policies. It may be incorrect to design antipoverty interventions with
the assumption that targeting poor households suﬃces in reaching poor or deprived
children. Non-monetary dimensions of welfare also need to be considered. The
stunting of children in non-poor families seems to be an issue of lack of awareness.
Children in rural areas require the most intervention. However, the issue of whether
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existing social protection programs have any impact on children's well-being remains
as an important research agenda which we investigate in the upcoming essay.
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3. Impacts of Social Protection
Programs on Children’s Resources
and Well-being
3.1. Introduction
Putting in place proper measurement and evaluation techniques is a crucial com-
ponent of social protection programs. This has both theoretical and global policy
backs. Theory-wise, while gauging the full eﬀect of an intervention on child poverty,
for example, use of unitary or household level measures may hide the impact since
ignoring the inequality in intrahousehold resource allocation leads to considerable
understatement of the poverty level (Haddad and Kanbur, 1990; Dunbar et al.,
2013; Bargain et al., 2014). Children may be severely aﬀected by such an inequality.
As an income source, transfers from social protection programs accrue to diﬀerent
household members with varying preferences thereby making unitary poverty indi-
cators inappropriate. In a global policy front, poverty of children, women and men
is emphasized in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the importance of
measuring poverty at those disaggregated levels is also recommended to the World
Bank by the Commission on Global Poverty (CGP) (World Bank, 2017). Moreover,
the multidimensionality of well-being is recognized by the Report by the Commis-
sion (Stiglitz et al., 2009), UN's Human Development reports, and also echoed very
recently by the SDGs and the CGP.
Use of estimated household resource shares from a collective consumption model
(Chiappori, 1988, 1992) has been pursued as the latest approach to measuring child
poverty and applied to data from sub-Saharan Africa countries (Dunbar et al.,
2013; Bargain et al., 2014). However, the impact of social protection programs
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on children's resource-based bargaining power and poverty within such a collective
framework is least researched and far from being obvious. Besides the monetary di-
mensions of child well-being, understanding the responses to a program in terms of
children's non-monetary outcomes such as nutrition, education, health, and family-
wide living standards may show comprehensive and long-term impacts. In so doing,
one can assess a program's eﬀect on deprivations in needs and capabilities. While
one can expect a positive eﬀect of social transfer programs, they may still have no or
negative impact by reducing individual's incentive to work (Farrington and Slater,
2006) or crowding out private transfers (Jensen, 2004). Moreover, the eﬀects on
children's nutritional and educational deprivations as well as aggregate multidimen-
sional deprivations may be undesirable when a social program has a parental labor
requirement.
The Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) of Ethiopia is Africa's largest social
protection scheme outside of South Africa. Designed to tackle chronic food inse-
curity and asset depletion in rural populations through transfers, it has covered 8
million beneﬁciaries since its inception in 2005. PSNP has two modalities: public
work (PW) transfers for working in labor-intensive community projects, and un-
conditioned direct support (DS) transfers, in cash or in-kind, primarily to those
with limited labor capacity such as the disabled and elderly. There are also other
smaller, allied social protection programs like food-for-work, cash-for-work, free food
and household asset building on which the survey we use collects data. PSNP and al-
lied programs may beneﬁt children directly (e.g. through food consumption) and/or
indirectly through intrahousehold transfers from adults. In contrast, the positive
income eﬀect could be outweighed. For instance, the public work requirement of
PSNP may force children to work on the family farm and/or domestic chores at the
expense of their school/studying time and health. Separate and joint impacts of
the programs on various forms of children's well-being and bargaining power is an
empirical matter which this study shall investigate.
There is a fairly large body work evaluating the impact of Ethiopia's PSNP. However,
this literature limits itself to household level outcomes. For example, signiﬁcant
positive impacts are found on food security and asset holding (Gilligan et al., 2009;
Berhane, 2014); credit for productive purposes and engagement in own non-farm
businesses (Gilligan et al., 2009); and agricultural technology adoption, productivity
and investment (Hoddinott et al., 2012). Hoddinott et al. (2012) also examine
68
3.1 Introduction
the joint impact of the PSNP and Other Food Security Program/Household Asset
Building Program transfers on agricultural productivity. Very recently, few papers
also document impacts on child-level outcomes such as on child nutrition (Porter and
Goyal, 2016; Berhane et al., 2017) and child education (Favara et al., 2016). However,
there is no ample evidence on how PSNP and allied transfers aﬀect intrahousehold
resource allocation and child well-being.
This study, therefore, primarily aims to ﬁll this lacuna by evaluating the separate
and joint impacts of those social protection programs (PSNP's PW, DS and allied
assistances) on child resources and shares as well as on monetary poverty, undernu-
trition and multidimensional deprivation. LSMS-ISA data for the study come from
Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey 2013/14.
Impacts in the form of average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATET) are iden-
tiﬁed by the inverse-probability-weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA) which
also controls for other correlates of outcomes besides treatment including previous
participation. Alternative speciﬁcations, disaggregations and traditional propen-
sity score matching (PSM) methods are used for checking robustness. For outcome
variables observed in 2013/14 and program participation throughout the past year,
we match participant and non-participant households using variables observed in
2011/12. These include demographic, economic and geographic correlates. PSNP
participation is reviewed every year with possible graduation from the program by
the no-more-eligibles and inclusion of new ones.
We ﬁnd that PSNP separately and jointly with allied joint transfers reduce relative
resource shares of children. These range from 0.7 percent to 3 percent depending on
the type of program. In contrast, allied transfers increase resource shares of boys.
Impacts on child monetary poverty are generally mixed and directly follow from
eﬀects on sharing rules: when a program positively aﬀects child resource shares,
it decreases child poverty and vice versa. We ﬁnd that PSNPs and a joint with
allied transfers increase child poverty, allied transfers alone decrease it. In contrast,
household-level poverty is generally not aﬀected except a reduction eﬀect by direct
supports only after a previous participation is controlled. Public works (only for
under-sevens) and allied programs desirably impact child multidimensional depri-
vation. We also ﬁnd that under-seven children, speciﬁcally boys, living in public
works families are more stunted than their counterparts in non-PW families. Other
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transfers are found to have no impact on child stunting. Results are checked for
being robust using PSM estimators.
Our results also lend support to previous evidence that when women receive exoge-
nous transfers, child outcomes improve (Duﬂo, 2000). For example, we ﬁnd that
PW program signiﬁcantly reduces children's resources in male-headed families while
their monthly resources in levels are higher when the single-mother head is in PW.
This also matters to child and household poverty. Estimates, for instance, show
that when the head is male, child and household poverty slightly increase with PW
transfers. In contrast, when the head receiving the PW transfers is a single-mother,
both child and household poverty slightly decrease. Comparing the two family types
regarding impacts on child nutritional outcomes, we ﬁnd that only children in male-
headed families in PW are signiﬁcantly stunted while the impact in single-mother
families is, as expected, negative though insigniﬁcant in a statistical sense.
The ﬁndings that children's poverty, undernutrition and multidimensional depriva-
tions are worse or not better for participants of a social protection program are quite
unwelcome. The nonimpact and undesirable impacts of PSNP need attention such
as through incorporating awareness on child nutrition and education. Restricting
receipts of transfers to females may also help. Although designed at the household
level, with the implicit assumption that targeting poor households suﬃces in reach-
ing poor or deprived children, improving on these considerations is crucial. The
remainder of the current (second) essay is organized as follows. The second section
discusses the methods while the third section describes the social protection pro-
grams, the data and empirical strategy. After presenting the results in the fourth
section, we lastly conclude.
3.2. Methods
3.2.1. Outcome Variables of Interest: Children’s Resources and
Well-being
In order to look into the household black box, we pursue the collective model of
Chiappori (1988, 1992) which assumes that household decisions are Pareto-eﬃcient.
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This implies that family decisions are made in a decentralized fashion in two stages:
(i) Members decide on how to share the total household expenditure so that each
member receives a sharing rule; (ii) Given the sharing rule, each member maximizes
her own utility subject to her individual budget constraint, ﬁnally choosing opti-
mal consumption of assignable and non-assignable goods. A collective Almost Ideal
Demand System (CAIDS) is estimated to recover children's shares from household
resources following Menon et al. (2017) and Mangiavacchi et al. (2018). The sharing
rule is speciﬁed as a function of observed individual expenditure and a vector of
distribution factors, variables which aﬀect intrahousehold bargaining but not pref-
erences. For a detailed description of the estimation of children's resource shares,
see Appendix A.2.
After recovering children's expenditure shares, one can use them to identify whether
a child is monetarily-poor. This new approach is superior to the traditional approach
of using adult-equivalence scales or per-capita expenditure which do not consider
intrahousehold inequality in resource allocation. For comparison, we also consider
household poverty as one of the outcomes. Besides monetary indicators of child
well-being, we also use the available child anthropometric information to recover
the nutritional status of under-seven children. In particular, the standards of the
World Health Organization (WHO) are used to identify whether a child is stunted
(height-for-age z-score is less than two standard deviations). As child well-being is
multidimensional, we lastly incorporate a range of non-monetary dimensions (child
education, health, nutrition and living standards) into a child multidimensional
deprivation index. Procedures of the counting approach (Alkire and Foster, 2011)
are used to identify whether a child is multidimensionally-deprived.
In a nutshell, the study aims to ﬁnd if PSNP and allied social transfers, separately
and jointly, have any impacts on the following outcome variables: child bargaining
(proxied by child resource shares and monetary values) and child well-being (mone-
tary poverty, undernutrition and multidimensional deprivation) as well as household
monetary poverty. Matching methods coupled with regression discussed below help
identify the impacts where available.
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3.2.2. Estimation of Impacts Using Matching and Regression
Methods
We use matching methods to estimate the various impacts of the programs on our
proposed outcome variables. But before resorting to matching, we explored other
impact estimator options. In fact, the design of the PSNP makes it diﬃcult to
eﬀectively apply other methods. Gilligan et al. (2009); Hoddinott et al. (2012);
Porter and Goyal (2016); Favara et al. (2016); Berhane et al. (2017) are some of
other studies using matching methods for the similar program. In what follows, we
shortly discuss why this study and those researchers evaluating PSNP end up in
matching procedures.
The basic problems of any impact evaluation exercise - the counterfactual and selec-
tion bias - can generally be addressed by the following methods: randomized evalu-
ation design, regression discontinuity design (RDD), instrumental variables (IV) or
matching estimators. However, a randomized design evaluation of the PSNP was
impossible, due to Ethiopian government's refusal at the outset (Berhane et al.,
2017). RDD was not feasible either since there was no cut-oﬀ or threshold applied
by local authorities in selecting beneﬁciaries. The next option is use of IV which
needs identifying an instrument aﬀecting the treatment variable directly without
aﬀecting the outcome variable unless via the treatment. However, our search for
strong instruments was not successful. In view of all these, we are forced to resort
to matching methods.
There is ample evidence that matching estimators help reduce selection bias due to
systematic diﬀerences between treated and comparison units (Dehejia and Wahba,
1999; Smith and Todd, 2005). We use an extended version of matching where re-
gression can be used to control for other correlates of the outcome variable: Inverse-
probability-weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA). For checking robustness of
the estimates, we also use the traditional propensity score matching (PSM) meth-
ods where impacts are estimated in non-parametric procedures.
Let Y1i represents a program's outcome if unit i is in a treatment state and Y0i if in
a control state. If the program is random, its eﬀect on unit i is
∆i = Y1i − Y0i
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which is not directly observable because only one of the two counterfactual treatment
situations is observed. The average treatment eﬀect is
ATE = E[∆i] = E[Y1i − Y0i].
The average treatment eﬀect on the treated population (ATET), which is the pri-
mary treatment eﬀect of interest in non-experimental settings (Dehejia and Wahba,
1999) such as ours, is given by
ATET = E[∆i|Ti = 1] = E[(Y1i − Y0i)|Ti = 1] = E[Y1i|Ti = 1]− E[Y0i|Ti = 1]
where Ti = 1 if unit i is in treatment and Ti = 0 if in control. The ATET answers the
question how much did persons participating in the program beneﬁt compared to
what they would have experienced without participating in the program? (Heckman
et al., 1997). The challenge is that E[Y0i|Ti = 1] cannot be observed and using
E[Y0i|Ti = 0] instead provides a potentially biased estimator of ATET , unless the
program is random, where the size of the bias is B = E[Y0i|Ti = 1]− E[Y0i|Ti = 0].
Randomization, hence, implies
(Y0i, Y1i)‖Ti ⇒ E[Y0i|Ti = 1] = E[Y0i|Ti = 0] = E[Yi|Ti = 0]
where Yi = Ti · Y1i + (1 − Ti) · Y0i is the observed value of the outcome variable so
that B = 0. In other words, no systematic diﬀerence exists between the treated
and control groups, making the conditioning on Ti in the expectation unnecessary
(Dehejia and Wahba, 1999) so that ATE = ATET with randomization.
Propensity Score Matching (PSM)
In the absence of randomization and experiments, evaluation methods pursuing
matching based on observable characteristics may oﬀer a way to estimate average
treatment eﬀects. However, these methods require the assumption of unconfound-
edness or conditional independence introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
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In particular, the unconfoundedness assumption states that
(Y0i, Y1i)‖Ti|Xi
which says that beyond the observed covariates Xi there are no (unobserved) charac-
teristics of the unit associated both with the potential outcomes and the treatment1
and implies that E[Yi|Ti, Xi] = E[Yi|Xi].
To reduce the dimensionality problem arising from using multiple obervables, Rosen-
baum and Rubin (1983) propose use of the propensity score p(Xi) which measures
the probability of unit i receiving treatment conditional on obervables. In this case,
the unconfoundedness assumption can be equivalently expressed as
Pr(Di = 1|Y1i, Y0i, Xi) = Pr(Di = 1|Xi) = E(Di|Xi) ≡ p(Xi)
which excludes the dependence between potential outcomes and the probability of
selection into treatment. This is a condition at the center of the econometrics of
self-selection.
In PSM methods, once the propensity score p(Xi) is estimated and a matching
method is decided, it is used to match units who receive the treatment to those who
do not (comparison group). The sample counterpart of the ATET is estimated as
(Dehejia and Wahba, 1999)
ÂTET = ∆ˆ|T=1 = 1
NT
∑
iT
(
Y Ti −
1
NC
∑
jCi
Y Cj
)
where NT is the number of units in the treatment group and NC is the number of
units in the comparison group (Ci) matched to unit i.
We employ matching methods of kernel-based and radius in the empirical exercise.
In kernel-based matching, the control unit outcome matched to a treated observation
is obtained as kernel-weighted average of control unit outcomes. In radius matching,
1Pure randomization (Y0i, Y1i)‖Ti is a particularly strong version of unconfoundedness in which
treatment assignment is unconfounded independently of pre-treatment variables.
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a control matched to a treated observation lies within a certain radius and where
multiple best controls are available, the average outcome of those controls is used.
Inverse-probability-weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA)
IPWRA estimator uses the propensity scores as weights to obtain outcome-regression
parameters that account for the counterfactual problem. These adjusted outcome-
regression parameters are then used to compute averages of treatment-level predicted
outcomes. The contrasts of these averages provide estimates of the treatment eﬀects.
Technically, once the treatment model is run and the propensity scores p(Xi) are
predicted, IPWRA runs two more basic steps. It ﬁrst runs two outcome variable
models, one for each of the treatment (T = 1) and comparison (T = 0) groups.
Suppose Z is a vector of covariates of the potential outcome variable Y , then
Y1i =
1
p(Xi)
[α1 +Z
′β1 + ε1i]
Y0i =
1
p(Xi)
[α0 +Z
′β0 + ε0i]
where α′s and β′s are parameters and ε′s are error terms. Note that the regres-
sions are weighted by the inverse-propensity scores 1
p(Xi)
. These then help estimate
treatment-speciﬁc predicted outcomes for each unit.
IPWRA ﬁnally computes and compares the means of the treatment-speciﬁc pre-
dicted outcomes where restricting average calculations to the treated units estimates
the ATET. The estimates are consistent as long as the treatment is independent of
the potential outcomes after conditioning on the covariates X. Further, the assump-
tion of the common support (overlap) ensures that predicted inverse-probability
weights 1
p(Xi)
are not too large. In fact, the two assumptions must also hold for
PSM.
However, if the treatment model is miss-speciﬁed, PSM will provide inconsistent
estimates. This is highly unlikely with IPWRA estimators since they have the
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double-robust property. Combining regression and weighting, IPWRA removes the
correlation between the omitted covariates and reduce the correlation between the
omitted and included variables (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2008). Put diﬀerently, if
the treatment model is miss-speciﬁed, estimates of the treatment eﬀect will still be
consistent so long as the outcome model is not also miss-speciﬁed and the reverse is
also true (Berhane et al., 2017).
Besides guaranteeing double-robustness, IPWRA also improves on PSM in terms of
eﬃciency. Berhane et al. (2017) discuss these gains in detail. By fully-specifying an
outcome outcome, IPWRA provides more eﬃciency by including control variables
and this precision gain is similar to the one we get by including additional covariates
in the evaluation of a randomized control trial. Ensuring balance across the base-
line covariates that appear in the treatment model used to estimate the propensity
scores is not required. IPWRA further increases statistical precision as it includes
more observations in the model that compares a treatment unit to its hypothetical
counterfactual.
3.3. The Productive Safety Net Program and the
Data
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) and Allied
Programs
The Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) of Ethiopia is Africa's largest social
protection scheme outside of South Africa. Designed to provide transfers to chroni-
cally food insecure and asset-poor rural populations, it has covered about 8 million
beneﬁciaries since its inception in 2005. It reaches to beneﬁciaries in two modalities.
The ﬁrst and the largest is the public works (PW) program in which beneﬁciaries,
who should be adult able-bodied people, receive payments after participating in
labor-intensive community projects. Major PW sub-projects include soil and water
conservation, water harvesting and supply schemes, aﬀorestation, infrastructure de-
velopment and construction of social services. The second, which primarily covers
those with limited labor capacity such as the disabled and elderly, is the uncondi-
tioned direct support (DS). Transfers could be made either in cash or in kind, usually
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grain. PW and DS participants receive the same rate of transfer. Households leave
the programs through graduation when they are able to accumulate assets. There
are also other smaller, allied social protection programs (hereafter allied programs)
like food-for-work, cash-for-work, free food and household asset building on which
the survey we use collects data.
There are no scientiﬁcally-designed eligibility criteria for joining the PSNP and
the majority of the allied programs. It rather uses administrative and community
level targeting approaches. The administrative targeting determines the number of
PNSP beneﬁciaries in a speciﬁc location (woreda and kebele). The community-based
approach involves identiﬁcation of potential beneﬁciaries by the community Food
Security Task Force (FSTF) and veriﬁcation of the beneﬁciaries in a public meeting
in which the entire PSNP beneﬁciary list is read out and discussed. FSTF is made
up of government oﬃcials, local elders and representatives of local associations (such
as of youth and women).
Usually, the kebele FSTF makes some assessment of the asset holdings of each house-
hold and ranks them. It then takes the list to the community gatherings to match
with the `quota' allocated by the woreda to the kebele (Tafere and Woldehanna,
2012). Eligibility cut-oﬀs vary. Tafere and Woldehanna (2012), for example, doc-
ument the following: In Tach-Meret and Zeytuni, having two oxen automatically
excluded households, whereas in Leki, in addition to possession of an ox, the size
of irrigable land was taken into account and in Buna the number of coﬀee seedlings
and sometimes enset (false banana) were considered. In Buna, as people cultivate
the land by hand using a hoe, having oxen is less important, and in Leki having
irrigable land was signiﬁcant as it could be rented out for good amount of money.
PSNP and allied programs may beneﬁt children directly (e.g. through food consump-
tion) and/or indirectly through intrahousehold transfers from adults. In contrast,
the positive income eﬀect could be outweighed. For instance, the public work re-
quirement of PSNP may force children to work on the family farm and/or domestic
chores at the expense of their school/studying time and health.
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The Data: Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (ESS)
Data for the study come from Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (ESS), collected jointly
by the World Bank and the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSA) as part
of the LSMS-ISA project. ESS is a panel survey with three waves to date (2011/12,
2013/14 and 2015/16). However, the 2011/12 wave lacks certain expenditure data
including on education, health, housing and food away from home. Lack of price
data for some goods also forced us to exclude the 2015/16 wave. Hence, this study
primarily employs the 2013/14 wave. ESS contains individual, household and com-
munity level data on a range of modules. Data on missing prices are obtained from
CSA's retail price surveys which are ﬁrst aggregated as 2013/14 averages to a zone
(province) level and then matched with the ESS.
To estimate children's (and adults') resource shares, we aggregate expenditure items
into four commodity groups: food and alcohol, clothing, household utilities and
energy, and other goods. These estimates are used to deﬁne the monetary dimension
of child well-being. Non-monetary dimensions of well-being are obtained from the
health, education, food security, housing and assets modules of ESS. Data on the
public work (PW) component of PSNP come from the time-use section of ESS while
its direct support (DW) component and other allied transfers are available in the
survey's assistance section. In order to match program participants with the non-
participants at baseline, we also import data from the 2011/12 round of ESS.
Empirical Strategy
To implement IPWRA (and PSM), we deﬁne treatment as participation in PSNP
public work, PSNP direct support, allied programs and joint PSNP-allied programs.
The program participation model is speciﬁed as a function of observed variables from
2011/12. The 2013/14 survey asks if a household had its member participating
in PSNP over the last year. Given that PSNP activities and payments are usu-
ally active from February, this question should collect information from 2012/13.
We thus consider household characteristics from the previous wave of the survey
(2011/12) as baseline information and use them to match program participants and
non-participants thereby ultimately estimating impacts in 2013/14.2 The following
2Berhane et al. (2017) also use a previous-year household livestock holdings as one correlate of
participation in PSNP's public work while estimating its impact on child nutrition.
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variables are used to specify treatment models in the various programs: gender and
age of the household head, number of adults of ages 18 to 60, land size, total live-
stock unit, receiving any income from nonfarm activities, and regional dummies.
The treatment models, which ultimately predict the propensity scores of program
participation, are estimated using a probit.
Besides the treatment model, IPWRA also needs to specify an outcome model. For
the four well-being-related outcome variables (child monetary poverty, undernutri-
tion, multidimensional deprivation and household monetary poverty), we employ
common covariates. These socio-demographic current-year (2013/14) outcome con-
trols are: gender and age of the child, age and education status of the household
head, if head is a single-mother, number of adults of ages 18 to 60, number of chil-
dren under 18, distances from main road and health facility, access to safe drinking
water, if the community faced any epidemic disease recently and regional dum-
mies. In a separate speciﬁcation, we also control if the household participated in a
program during the previous survey year (2011/12). And for resource allocation out-
come variables, namely, child resource shares and monetary resources, distribution
factors aﬀecting the resource sharing between children and adults are controlled be-
sides the above common socio-demographic covariates. Distribution factors include
whether all school-age children are attending school, proportions of female children
and women, and number of extended or non-biological children. The outcome mod-
els for continuous variables (child resource shares and values) are considered as linear
whereas binary outcome models are estimated using a probit.
3.4. Results and Discussion
3.4.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of some variables during the year of
interest (2013/14) and other variables from 2011/12 that are used for matching. Our
sample of children is a gender-balanced one with the average age of the child being
about 9 years. 3 percent of children live in households with a child mortality record
since two years while 14 percent of them experienced some form of illness over the
two months before surveyed. All school-age children are not in school: 7 percent
79
Impacts of Social Protection Programs on Children's Resources and Well-being
Table 3.1.: Descriptive statistics of some variables: ESS 2013/14 and 2011/12
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Table 3.2.: PSNP and allied programs participation and amount received: ESS
2013/14 & 2011/12
are not currently attending and 16 percent have no formal years of education. This
adds to the fact that 76 percent of children have an illiterate biological mother. A
considerable portion of children also live in poor housing conditions. This ranges
from 38 percent of them having no access to clean drinking water to 100 percent
living in households that use unimproved cooking materials such as wood and dung.
Only about half have access to information-providing assets such as radio.
The last two columns of Table 3.1 also describe the sample's characteristics in
2011/12 which we use to specify program participation to ultimately estimate the
propensity scores for matching participants with non-participants in 2013/14. For
instance, back in 2011/12, only 10 percent was headed by a female. Less number of
adults who can work than children was reported. Land size was less than a hectare
and about a ﬁfth faced natural shocks of either drought or ﬂood.
How are the extents of coverage of PSNP and allied programs and how much do
participants receive? Table 3.2 provides the summaries. The public work (PW)
component of the PSNP covers 7 percent of the sample of children whose family
member participated in 2013/14. In the previous wave of the survey (2011/12),
this was higher at 10 percent. On the other hand, only 2 percent of children have
a household member covered in PSNP's direct support and this ﬁgure remained
unchanged since the previous wave. 8 percent have their families reporting to have
received any other non-PSNP, allied assistance (in terms of cash-for-work, inputs-for-
work, etc.). Regarding the amount of money received from each of those programs,
one can easily observe that PSNP's public works program provides relatively lesser
amounts and the receipts in all programs increase over the years of the survey.
Table 3.3 describes outcome variables by various programs as well as for the full sam-
ple of children and under-seven-olds. In general, we observe slight diﬀerences among
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Table 3.3.: Mean of outcome variables by child sample program participation: ESS
2013/14
children in the three programs in terms of monetary and non-monetary outcomes.
For instance, a child of a family participating in public works program commands 14
percent of the family's expenditure whereas a child in direct support program has a
higher share at 19 percent. These compare with the 15 percent share for the whole
sample of children. Consequently, poverty among children as well as household
poverty with DS is slightly lower than those with PW. Multidimensional depriva-
tion and child stunting rates are also slightly lower among under-seven children in
DS than in PW although multidimensional deprivation rate goes in the opposite
direction for all children. The question that we ask at this point is the following:
does participation in these programs have any impact on children's resources and
welfare? The next sub-sections provide answers.
3.4.2. Correlates of Participation in PSNP and Allied Programs
Recall that participations in PSNP and allied programs in 2012/13 are speciﬁed as
functions of observed variables from the previous wave of the survey (2011/12) to
ultimately measure impacts on outcomes in 2013/14. Previous survey round vari-
ables used as covariates of treatment include characteristics of the head, household
labor, economic status, and regional dummies.
Table 3.4 summarizes probit regression results (marginal eﬀects) of participation
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Table 3.4.: Correlates of participation in PSNP and allied programs (marginal
eﬀects from probit): ESS 2013/14
in the three programs (public work, direct support and allied programs) as well
as the joint of PSNP (either PW or DS) with allied programs. In general, every
variable is statistically signiﬁcant in at least two of the four regressions. In particular,
female-headed households are found to have higher chance of participation in both
of PSNP's PW and DS programs. As expected, head's age is correlated negatively
with participation in PW and allied programs but positively with that of DS. As a
corollary to this, households with more labor force (proxied here by the number of
adults aged 18 to 60 years) are found to have less probability of receiving DS. Recall
that DS is designed primarily for those with limited labor such as the elderly and
disabled. Labor-rich households are also less likely to be part of allied programs as
well as a joint of these with PSNP's PW or DS.
Besides those demographic factors, almost all economic variables have also the ex-
pected correlations with participation in PSNP and allied programs. For example,
those with large land holdings are less likely to engage in just PSNP programs unless
they are in joint with allied programs of input-for-work or cash-for-work. Expect-
edly as well, higher livestock holdings and income from non-farm activities have the
eﬀects of consistently reducing participation in all programs. Berhane et al. (2017)
document similar results when they ﬁnd PW participation likelihoods fall for land-
and livestock-wealthier households.
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Figure 3.1.: Kernel densities of the propensity scores for common support: ESS
2013/14
From the highly-signiﬁcant regional dummies, we lastly notice presence of large
spatial variations in participation likelihood. Compared with other small regions
altogether, households in the regions of Amhara, Oromia and SNNP are generally
less likely to involve in the social protection programs. An exception is Tigray where
higher participation in both PSNP programs is observed.
Before directly proceeding to presenting the impact estimates, let us see how close
are the non-participants that are matched with participants. This is a requirement in
impact estimation methods based on (inverse) propensity scores and can be checked
by existence of a common support which implies that the probability of being a par-
ticipant (non-participant) is both non-zero and less than 1. Figure 3.1 depicts kernel
densities of the propensity scores for both groups and show that their distributions
overlap in all programs thereby conﬁrming presence of a common support.
We also use formal balancing tests to check how similar are the correlates of pro-
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gram participation between treated and control groups. We follow the standardized
bias approach of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to check the power of the match-
ing approach in balancing the relevant covariates of these two groups. The results
for public works program are presented in Table A.7 of the Appendix. The overall
average bias before matching was 18% signiﬁcantly falling to 4.4% after matching
implying improvement in the balancing characteristics of the treatment and the
matched comparison groups. Moreover, none of the mean diﬀerences of each covari-
ate between the treatment group and the matched comparison group is statistically
signiﬁcant.
3.4.3. Impacts of PSNP and Allied Programs on Children’s
Resources and Well-being
Once a probit treatment model is estimated and propensity scores are predicted,
participant and non-participants are matched. We primarily choose the inverse-
probability-weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA) since its parametric feature
helps to control for other covariates of the outcome variable including previous pro-
gram participation. Results from two non-parametric PSM-based methods (kernel
and radius matching) are also reported in the Appendix. In addition to previous
program involvement, our IPWRA outcome regression models control for various
socio-demographic and economic variables which include characteristics of children,
the household head, the household and community at large.
Below, we present and discuss the eﬀects of PSNP's public work (PW), direct sup-
port (DS) and other allied social protection transfers on children's relative resource
shares, absolute resource receipts and their well-being in terms of monetary poverty,
undernutrition and multidimensional deprivation. We also present the eﬀects of
simultaneous participation in PSNPs and allied transfers. The various outcome
variables are analyzed in three categories: resource allocation, monetary poverty
and non-monetary deprivation.
3.4.3.1. Impacts of PSNP’s Public Work
Table 3.5 summarizes IPWRA impact estimates of PSNP's public work (PW) on
children's relative resource and well-being. We ﬁnd that PW participation reduces
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Table 3.5.: Impacts of PSNP's public work on children's resources and well-being:
IPWRA method
the child's average share of household resources and the eﬀect remains unchanged
after controlling for a previous participation. However, the magnitude of the impact
is very small. Speciﬁcally, a household's engagement in PW has the eﬀect of de-
creasing children's share of total household expenditure by 0.7 percent. The overall
negative impact of public work transfers on children's relative resource allocations
is also robust to alternative matching methods although of larger magnitude. Non-
parametric PSM estimators (kernel and radius matching) provide a signiﬁcant and
negative impact of 1.4 percent (see panel (a) of Table A.8 at the Appendix).
Disaggregating the IPWRA estimates by children's gender indicates that all the
signiﬁcant impact is related to boys; resource shares of girls do not seem to be
adversely aﬀected by their family's participation in PW. On the other hand, PW
transfers have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on children's resources in levels in general but
raise girls' monthly resources only slightly by 1.14 Ethiopian Birr (ETB).
Although it is diﬃcult to provide a direct explanation to the negative eﬀect of
PW transfers on children's relative home resource allocations, the program's labor
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requirement may give some hint. ESS data show that participation in PW by male
adults of ages 18 to 65 is as almost twice as that of female adults which may pave
ways for consumption of adult goods like alcohol and food away from home by men
at the expense of (or no change to) children's goods. Children may even drop from
school since engagement of adults in PW may force them to work on household
chores or the farm thereby reducing their monetary shares. We attempt to see
if the public works force children to engage in any non-domestic work, including
substituting their parents in the PW project works, and ﬁnd that it does. The
result on the education issue is not the expected one. Same results are conﬁrmed
by PSM techniques (reported in Table A.8 of the Appendix).
Yet another explanation could be found from the type of family structure: male-
headed or single mother. This partly captures who in the household gets the PW
transfers. We ﬁnd that PW program signiﬁcantly reduces children's resources in
male-headed families (see column (4) of Table 3.5). In contrast, the average child's
monthly resources in levels are higher by 1.48 ETB when the single-mother head
is in PW. This adds to the evidence elsewhere in Africa that when women receive
exogenous transfers, child outcomes improve (Duﬂo, 2000). Mangiavacchi et al.
(2018) analyze the eﬀect of remittances by a migrating household adult member on
children's resource shares and ﬁnd a positive impact in Albania. This is partly be-
cause migration of an adult frees resources to children and the majority of remitting
members are males which may allow children to enjoy maternal altruism.
The impact of PW program participation on the incidence of children's monetary
poverty and its explanations descend from PW's impact on children's resource al-
locations despite the fact that the poverty line also matters. After using a child's
estimated resource shares and age-adjusted poverty line to judge a child monetarily-
poor, we ﬁnd that PW slightly increases poverty incidence. In particular, compared
with those in non-participant families, children in PW families are 2.5 percent poorer
although the ﬁgure is only marginally signiﬁcant. However, the eﬀect disappears
when disaggregated by gender and the outcome regression controls for recent past
PW program participation. Motivated to loosely evaluate if PW has diﬀerential
eﬀects on the poverty of children and of the household in general, we ﬁnd that there
is no such an impact unless a 2011/12 participation is controlled for where PW
households are poorer by 5 percent, again marginally, relative to non-participants.
Gilligan et al. (2009) also ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of PW on per capita consumption
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expenditure as well as household assets.
Another interesting ﬁnding is that it matters to child and household poverty who
receives the transfer as proxied by the type of family structure. Estimates show
that when the head is male, child and household poverty slightly but signiﬁcantly
increase with PW transfers. In contrast, when the head receiving the PW transfers
is a single-mother, both child and household poverty slightly decrease though the
fall in child poverty is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Besides the monetary dimension, we also look at how public works program aﬀects
the non-monetary dimensions of child well-being. We aggregate into a weighted mul-
tidimensional deprivation incidence measure of over 10 indicators of three dimen-
sions (child schooling, health and living standards). IPWRA estimates generally
show that there is no impact except a marginally-signiﬁcant deprivation-worsening
eﬀect of 6 percent among boys in PW participating households. One explanation
for this could be children are absent from school due to work. Data from the ESS
show that a third of children missing classes for over a week mention working as
their main reason (not reported).
We lastly investigate the eﬀect of the public works wing of PSNP on the well-being
of children under the age of seven years and over 6 months whose nutritional infor-
mation is collected. IPWRA estimator, which also controls health-related variables
such as access to clean drinking water and common health shocks, shows that PW
participation by parents worsens undernutrition (stunting) among under-7 children
which is signiﬁcant only for under-7 boys. The size of the impact, 9 percent (13
percent among boys), is more pronounced when a previous PW engagement is taken
into account, rising to 13 percent (19 percent among boys). Comparing the two
family types, we ﬁnd that only children in male-headed families are signiﬁcantly
undernourished while the impact in single-mother families is, as expected, negative
though insigniﬁcant in statistical sense. Multidimensional deprivation among under-
7s, which also includes stunting among other dimensions, is nonetheless found to be
better in PW families, this time signiﬁcantly in favor of under-7 female children and
irrespective of accounting for previous participation.
Despite the expectation that children in households participating in a social protec-
tion program experience improved nutrition (less stunting in our case), undesirable
impacts (or nonimpact) cannot be ruled out for programs that have an adult labor
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requirement such as the public works program of PSNP. One explanation is that in-
creased household income due to the program may not translate into improved child
nutrition (Porter and Goyal, 2016). As mentioned earlier, which type of household
member, male or female, participates and gets the transfers also matters. To look
more into this issue, we disaggregate results by family structure and ﬁnd that under-7
child stunting due to PW is only worse in male-headed households and the coeﬃcient
is negative though insigniﬁcant for those in single-mother families (not reported).
Moreover, due to the labor requirement of PW, children receive less parental time
for cooking and helping calories burned. Previous evidence in the literature on the
impact of PW on child nutrition is inconclusive. For example, while Porter and
Goyal (2016) estimate a nutrition-improving impact, Berhane et al. (2017) ﬁnd no
impact and argue that parental lack of information about child nutrition is to blame
for the nonimpact. Gilligan et al. (2009) do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of PW on
the daily number of child meals that is related to their nutritional outcomes.
3.4.3.2. Impacts of PSNP’s Direct Support
Table 3.6 provides impacts of participation in the direct support (DS) component
of PSNP on children's relative resource and well-being. Similar to the case in PW,
we ﬁnd that DS transfers have a small, negative and signiﬁcant impact on per-child
share of household resources. This eﬀect on the full child sample is robust to a
speciﬁcation that controls for past participation and alternative impact estimators
(see panel (b) of Table A.8 at the Appendix for PSM estimates). Also like PW, the
negative eﬀect is only signiﬁcant for male children and those living in male-headed
households. Estimates range from less shares by 2 percent for all children to 2
percent for male children, relative to non-DS children. However, IPWRA estimates
do not provide any signiﬁcant eﬀect of DS participation on the monetary values of
children's resources except when the household head is a male where the average
child's monthly expenditures fall by 1.2 birr due to PW. In single-mothers, eﬀects
on child resources are not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
In spite of the expected ﬁnding that DS in general reduces household monetary
poverty, the impact on child poverty is undesirable and signiﬁcant throughout. These
results are also robust to alternative estimations with inclusion of a previous partic-
ipation and disaggregated data by gender, family structure. Moreover, impacts on
89
Impacts of Social Protection Programs on Children's Resources and Well-being
Table 3.6.: Impacts of PSNP's direct support on children's resources and well-
being: IPWRA method
poverty incidences are also supported by kernel and radius matching estimators of
PSM (Table A.8). There are few signiﬁcant household poverty-reducing impacts of
direct support transfers that make it diﬀerent from PW. It should be noted, however,
that DS has eﬀects on household poverty only when the outcome regression controls
for a 2011/12 participation and in households with boys (in both speciﬁcations).
In contrast, children in families covered by direct supports have more multiple depri-
vations compared with those in families not covered by the program. The impacts
in both speciﬁcations and disaggregations are higher and highly signiﬁcant, reaching
13 percent, and are conﬁrmed by PSM estimators in Table A.8. But, for the under-
seven child sample, the eﬀect on multidimensional deprivations vanishes. Moreover,
we ﬁnd no eﬀect of participation in DS on under-seven child stunting despite control-
ling for a previous same program participation. The low number of DS participants
with under-seven children did not allow us to run disaggregations by gender.
The nonimpacts as well as worsening impacts of direct support transfers on child
monetary poverty and multidimensional deprivation could be explained on grounds
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of intrahousehold resource allocation and the size of transfers themselves. The ﬁnd-
ing that children relatively command on less resources in families receiving the trans-
fers automatically implies that they are more poorer and deprived than those in
non-recipient families. Moreover, the size of the transfer may not be large enough to
lift beneﬁciaries out of poverty and deprivation or help accumulate assets. It seems
noting this that Gilligan et al. (2009) specify the per-member beneﬁts from PSNP
to 90 birr although they still ﬁnd no eﬀects on total household expenditure, meals
and assets. Tafere and Woldehanna (2012) also qualitatively ﬁnd that the amount
of transfer is so small to help some households achieve the programs objective of
food security.
3.4.3.3. Impacts of Allied Transfers
Transfers which we refer to 'allied' are those social protection programs that have
almost similar objectives as the PSNP but may not necessarily be delivered by
the government as non-governmental organizations also oﬀer them. ESS collects
data if households participate in these transfer programs in the form of cash-for-
work, input-for-work, etc. We aim to see if such programs do have any impact on
children's well-being in beneﬁciary households and if those impacts, if any, diﬀer
from PNSP's.
In Table 3.7, we summarize the impacts of allied transfers on children's relative
resource and well-being. Unlike PSNP's PW and DS, which have negative eﬀects,
allied transfers generally have no impact on children's resource shares even after sim-
ilar previous engagements are taken into account by the IPWRA output regression.
The eﬀect is only robust to a kernel estimator of the PSM results, reported at panel
(c) of Table A.8 in the Appendix). However, a unique ﬁnding here is that boys in
allied transfer families command on more household resources, though higher only
by 1 percent, than those in non-recipient families. On the other hand, estimates
reveal no signiﬁcant eﬀects of allied transfers on the monetary resources allotted to
children.
Moving to impacts on monetary poverty, recall that we ﬁnd both PSNPs generally
worsen child poverty, with the popular public works wing having a marginally-
signiﬁcant impact for all children while the direct support component aﬀecting highly
signiﬁcantly in all speciﬁcations. On the contrary, we now estimate that allied
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Table 3.7.: Impacts of allied transfers on children's resources and well-being: IP-
WRA method
transfers have generally a child poverty-reducing eﬀect where poverty incidence is
lesser by about 4 percent. Although the same impact sustains with controlling past
program participation, it disappears for female children while boys in such allied
programs are 6 percent less poor relative to non-recipients. On the other hand,
allied transfers are also found to increase poverty at the household level in the full
sample, households with girls and those headed by male.
The other notable diﬀerence between PSNP transfers and allied transfers in terms of
impact is that the latter reduce children's multiple deprivations. In particular, chil-
dren bound to non-PSNP (allied) supports are less likely to be multidimensionally-
deprived by 5 percent which is higher for boys (9 percent) although impact is nonex-
istent for girls. In contrast, we earlier ﬁnd that PW has generally no such an impact,
unless data is restricted to under-seven children where impact is favorably negative,
and DS has the undesirable eﬀect of worsening children's multiple deprivation. Our
data fall short of providing impacts of allied supports on the undernutrition and
multiple deprivation of children under the age of seven which is similar to DS in this
regard.
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Table 3.8.: Joint impacts of PSNP & allied transfers on children's resources &
well-being: IPWRA method
3.4.3.4. Joint Impacts of PSNP and Allied Transfers
What happens to children's resource-related bargaining power and well-being if their
families participate simultaneously in PSNP and allied social protection schemes?
In this study, despite unable to provide results for under-seven children as not so
many such households participate in both programs, we present impact estimates
for the full sample of children, also disaggregated by family structure and gender.
Results are summarized in Table 3.8.
Estimates show that full sample joint impacts on children's resource shares are
similar to the separate impacts of PW and DS. Children living in households who
receive any of PW or DS transfers coupled with other allied transfers, compared with
children of families who do not receive such beneﬁts, see their shares in household
expenditures falling by 1 percent. This impact is also robust to consideration of the
2011/12 joint receipt of the transfers and to alternative matching methods whose
results are available in panel (d) of Appendix Table A.8. The negative impact
is also visible on children in male-headed families. However, unlike the separate
impacts of PW, DS and allied transfers, joint participation reduces resource shares
of girls, despite being marginally signiﬁcant. On the other hand, joint transfers are
generally found to have no signiﬁcant impact on children's resources in levels. But
when disaggregated by gender, they raise boys' monthly expenditures only slightly
by 1.14 ETB.
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Regarding monetary poverty, we ﬁnd no impacts of the joint transfers with the full
child sample. Neither do they impact household level monetary poverty except in
male-headed families where eﬀect is unfavorable. However, girls in joint transfers are
found to be poorer than those in non-recipient families. The data also fall short to
provide further eﬀect on children's multidimensional deprivation except on children
in single-mother families where it is undesirable.
Looking at joint impact of PSNP and related programs is not new although none
evaluates eﬀects on child outcomes. For example, Hoddinott et al. (2012) examine
the joint impact of the PSNP and Other Food Security Program/Household Asset
Building Program (OFSP/HABP) transfers on agricultural productivity. Using a
dose-response method, they ﬁnd that access to the PSNP plus OFSP/HABP trans-
fers improve use of fertilizer and enhanced agricultural investments. They also ﬁnd
participation in the PSNP alone has no eﬀect on agricultural input use or produc-
tivity and limited impact on agricultural investments.
3.5. Conclusions
Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) is Africa's second largest social
protection program with public works (PW) and direct support (DS) components.
There are also other allied transfer programs to the PSNP in the form of cash-for-
work, inputs-for-work, free food and asset building programs. The study evaluates
the separate and joint impacts of PSNP and allied transfer programs on children's
resource-related bargaining power and well-being. Estimated resources and shares
from a collective demand system proxy bargaining power and child well-being is
measured by resource-based monetary poverty, undernutrition and multidimensional
deprivation. Impacts in the form of average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATET)
are estimated by the inverse-probability-weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA)
which also controls for other correlates of outcome variables. Alternative speciﬁ-
cations, disaggregations and traditional propensity score matching (PSM) methods
are used for checking robustness. For outcome variables observed in 2013/14 and
program participation throughout the past year, we match participant and non-
participant households using variables observed in 2011/12. LSMS-ISA data from
Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey 2013/14 are used.
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We ﬁnd that almost all of demographic, economic and geographic variables have
generally the expected correlations with participation in PSNP and allied programs.
In particular, female-headed households are found to have higher chance of partici-
pation in both of PSNP's PW and DS programs. In line with the design of DS for
those with limited labor such as the elderly and disabled, we ﬁnd head's age and
household labor force being inversely correlated with participation in DS. Moreover,
those with large land holdings are less likely to engage in just PSNP programs unless
they are in joint with allied transfers. Higher livestock holdings and income from
non-farm activities have all the eﬀect of consistently reducing participation in all
programs.
We estimate that PSNP programs separately, and jointly with allied transfers, have
the impact of slightly reducing children's relative resource shares. Allied transfers,
in contrast, increase resource shares of boys. Impacts on child monetary poverty
are quite mixed and directly follow from eﬀects on sharing rules: when a program
positively aﬀects child resource shares, it decreases child poverty and vice versa.
Accordingly, we ﬁnd that while PSNPs and a joint with allied transfers increase
child poverty, allied transfers alone decrease it. In contrast, household-level poverty
is generally not aﬀected except a reduction eﬀect by direct supports only after a
previous participation is controlled. Public works (only for under-sevens) and al-
lied programs desirably impact child multidimensional deprivation. We also ﬁnd
that under-seven children, speciﬁcally boys, living in public works families are more
stunted than their counterparts in non-PW families. Other transfers are found to
have no impact on child stunting. Results are checked for being robust using PSM
estimators.
Results particularly lend support to previous evidence that when women receive ex-
ogenous transfers, child outcomes improve. For example, we ﬁnd that PW program
signiﬁcantly reduces children's resources in male-headed families while their monthly
resources in levels are higher when the single-mother head is in PW. It also matters
to child and household poverty who is engaged in the transfer programs as proxied
by the type of family structure. Our estimates, for instance, show that when the
head is male, child and household poverty slightly increase with PW transfers. In
contrast, when the head receiving the PW transfers is a single-mother, both child
and household poverty slightly decrease. Comparing the two family types regarding
impacts on child nutritional outcomes, we ﬁnd that only children in male-headed
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families in PW are signiﬁcantly stunted while the impact in single-mother families
is, as expected, negative though insigniﬁcant in a statistical sense.
The ﬁndings that children's undernutrition and/or multidimensional deprivations
are worse or not better for participants of a social protection program are raise
questions. These may require revising the on-going social protection schemes to a
cash plus form such as by incorporating parental awareness on child nutrition and
education. Restricting receipts of transfers to females may also help.
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A. APPENDIX
A.1. Derivation of the Collective Demand System
Model
The derivation is based on Menon et al. (2017) and Mangiavacchi et al. (2013, 2018).
Consider an extended PIGLOG individual expenditure function:
lnek(uk,p) = lnAk(p) +
ϕ(uk)Bk(p)
1− ϕ(ukλk(p) = lnAk(p) +
Bk(p)
Ψ(uk)− λk(p)
where Ψ(uk) = ϕ(uk)
−1 is decreasing in utility ϕ(uk); p = {pc1 , pc2 , pq}; and
the continuous and concave price aggregators take up the usual functional forms:
lnAk(p) =
1
2
(
α0 +
∑
i
αilnpi +
1
2
∑
i
∑
j
γijlnpilnpj
)
, Bk(p) = β0Π
i
p
βki
i and λk(p) =∑
i
λki pi, assumed to be a diﬀerentiable, homogeneous function of degree zero of
prices. αi, γij, β
k
i and λ
k
i are parameters to be estimated. One can interpret the
price aggregator A(p) as that level of subsistence expenditure [or poverty expendi-
ture (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980)] of member k when her utility uk = 0. The
remaining two price aggregators, Bk(p) and λk(p), are associated with expendi-
ture levels of each household member whose variations allow identiﬁcation of the
corresponding parameters βki and λ
k
i .
Shephard's lemma gives individual Hicksian demand of good i as budget share:
wki =
∂lnek(uk,p)
∂lnpi
=
∂lnAk(p)
∂lnpi
+
∂Bk(p)
∂lnpi
[Ψ(uk)− λk(p)] +Bk(p)∂λk(p)∂lnpi
[Ψ(uk)− λk(p)]2 .
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Inverting this individual expenditure function gives indirect utility function:
Ψ(uk)− λk(p) = Bk(p)
lnek(uk,p)− lnAk(p) .
Substituting this gives the individual budget share of good i
wki =
∂lnAk(p)
∂lnpi
+
∂Bk(p)
∂lnpi
[ Bk(p)
lnek(uk,p)−lnAk(p) ] +Bk(p)
∂λk(p)
∂lnpi
[ Bk(p)
lnek(uk,p)−lnAk(p) ]
2
which could be expressed as:
wki =
∂lnAk(p)
∂lnpi
+ βki [lnek − lnAk(p)] + λki
[lnek − lnAk(p)]2
Bk(p)
.
Given the aforementioned informational constraint that quantities and prices of
non-assignable goods are not observed, the above decentralized budget shares are
aggregated at the household level for good i as follows:
wi = αi +
∑
j
γijlnpj + β
1
i [lne1 − lnA1(p)] + λ1i
[lne1 − lnA1(p)]2
B1(p)
+β2i [lne2 − lnA2(p)] + λ2i
[lne2 − lnA2(p)]2
B2(p)
.
Following Lewbel (1985) and Perali (2003), the demand system is augmented to
capture observed heterogeneity among households by introducing a translating tech-
nology ti(d) so that demographic attributes d enter additively with expenditures.
This provides the demographically-modiﬁed demand system as follows:
wi = αi + ti(d) +
∑
j
γijlnpj + β
1
i [lne
∗
1 − lnA1(p)] + λ1i
[lne∗1 − lnA1(p)]2
B1(p)
+β2i [lne
∗
2 − lnA2(p)] + λ2i
[lne∗2 − lnA2(p)]2
B2(p)
where lne∗1 and lne
∗
2 are modiﬁed logarithmic individual total expenditures given by
the translating household technology lne∗k = lnek −
∑
i
ti(d)lnpi. The demographic
functions are simply deﬁned as ti(d) =
∑
r
τirdr for r = 1, ...R. Note that from the
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above demand system, we can estimate, for each good i, income parameters (β1i , β
2
i ,
λ1i and λ
2
i ) at individual level while the rest at household level (i.e. the intercepts αi,
price parameters γij and demographic scaling eﬀects ti(d)). While price elasticities
remain the same as in the unitary setting, income elasticities capturing Engle eﬀects
for xi = ci, qi and for each household member k = 1, 2 are given in the decentralized
CQUAIDS by:
eki =
∂lnxi
∂lnek
= 1 +
βki
wi
+
2λki
Bk(p)
1
wi
(lnek − lnAk(p)).
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Table A.1.: Aggregation of consumption expenditure items: ESS 2013/14
Expenditure group/sub-group and item Recall* Price type
I. FOOD AT HOME AND ALCOHOL
All monthly
Unit values
(For alcoholic
drinks: CSA
retail prices)
1. Teﬀ 10. Lentils 19. Milk
2. Wheat 11. Haricot beans 20. Cheese
3. Barley 12. Niger seed 21. Eggs
4. Maize 13. Linseed 22. Sugar
5. Sorghum 14. Onion 23. Salt
6. Millet 15. Banana 24. Coﬀee
7. Horse beans 16. Potato 25. Bula
8. Chick pea 17. Kocho 26. Chat/Kat
9. Field pea 18. Meat 27. Alcoholic drinks
II. CLOTHING
All annually
CSA retail
prices
2.1. Adult clothing
1. Clothes/shoes/fabric for men
2. Clothes/shoes/fabric for women
2.2. Child clothing
1. Clothes/shoes/fabric for boys
2. Clothes/shoes/fabric for girls
2.3. Non-assignable clothing (Linen: sheets, towels, blankets)
III. HOUSEHOLD UTILITIES AND ENERGY
ESS local
prices and
CSA retail
prices
3.1. Utilities: water, electricity & cell phone/landline use Monthly
3.2. Household energy 5. Firewood Monthly
(Annually
for lamp)
1. Matches 3. Batteries 6. Kerosene
2. Candles (tua'f), incense 4. Charcoal 7. Lamp/torch
IV. OTHER GOODS
CSA retail
prices (For
transport: ESS
local prices)
4.1. Education: fees, books, uniforms, stationery, assistance, etc. Monthly
4.2. Food away from home and cigarettes Weekly
1. Full meals: breakfast, lunch, dinner
2. Snacks (kolo, bread, biscuits, cakes, etc.)
3. Dairy products (milk, yoghurt, etc.)
4. Vegetables and roasted/boiled items
5. Non-alcoholic drinks (coﬀee, tea, fruit juice, soda, etc.)
6. Cigarettes, tobacco, suret and gaya
4.2. Laundry and personal care Annually
4.3. Transport Monthly
Notes: *Recall periods here are as available in the ESS; all are ﬁnally converted to monthly values.
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Figure A.1.: Engel curves of commodity groups by family type
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Table A.2.: Regression of total household expenditure: First stage
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Table A.4.: Income and price elasticity estimates
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A.2 Estimation of children resource shares from a collective complete demand system
Figure A.2.: Sharing rules of children and adults over the income distribution
Notes: Shaded areas are 95% conﬁdence intervals. Observations are weighted to make estimates nationally repre-
sentative.
A.2. Estimation of children resource shares from a
collective complete demand system
The demand system model we specify follows from Menon et al. (2017) and Man-
giavacchi et al. (2013, 2018) who extend the QUAIDS of Banks et al. (1997) to
the collective framework and hence named the Collective Quadratic Almost Ideal
Demand System (CQUAIDS).
Consider an extended PIGLOG individual expenditure function:
lnek(uk,p) = lnAk(p) +
ϕ(uk)Bk(p)
1− ϕ(ukλk(p) = lnAk(p) +
Bk(p)
Ψ(uk)− λk(p)
where Ψ(uk) = ϕ(uk)
−1 is decreasing in utility ϕ(uk); p = {pc1 , pc2 , pq}; and
the continuous and concave price aggregators take up the usual functional forms:
lnAk(p) =
1
2
(
α0 +
∑
i
αilnpi +
1
2
∑
i
∑
j
γijlnpilnpj
)
, Bk(p) = β0Π
i
p
βki
i and λk(p) =
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∑
i
λki pi, assumed to be a diﬀerentiable, homogeneous function of degree zero of prices.
αi, γij, β
k
i and λ
k
i are parameters to be estimated.
Shephard's lemma gives individual Hicksian demand of good i as budget share:
wki =
∂lnek(uk,p)
∂lnpi
=
∂lnAk(p)
∂lnpi
+
∂Bk(p)
∂lnpi
[Ψ(uk)− λk(p)] +Bk(p)∂λk(p)∂lnpi
[Ψ(uk)− λk(p)]2 .
Inverting this individual expenditure function gives indirect utility function as
Ψ(uk)− λk(p) = Bk(p)
lnek(uk,p)− lnAk(p) .
Substituting this gives the individual budget share of good i
wki =
∂lnAk(p)
∂lnpi
+
∂Bk(p)
∂lnpi
[ Bk(p)
lnek(uk,p)−lnAk(p) ] +Bk(p)
∂λk(p)
∂lnpi
[ Bk(p)
lnek(uk,p)−lnAk(p) ]
2
which could be expressed as
wki =
∂lnAk(p)
∂lnpi
+ βki [lnek − lnAk(p)] + λki
[lnek − lnAk(p)]2
Bk(p)
.
Given the aforementioned informational constraint that quantities and prices of
non-assignable goods are not observed, the above decentralized budget shares are
aggregated at the household level for good i. After capturing observed heterogeneity
among households by introducing a translating technology ti(d) so that demographic
attributes d enter additively with expenditures, we have the demographically-modiﬁed
demand system as
wi = αi + ti(d) +
∑
j
γijlnpj + β
1
i [lne
∗
1 − lnA1(p)] + λ1i
[lne∗1 − lnA1(p)]2
B1(p)
+β2i [lne
∗
2 − lnA2(p)] + λ2i
[lne∗2 − lnA2(p)]2
B2(p)
where lne∗1 and lne
∗
2 are modiﬁed logarithmic individual total expenditures given by
the translating household technology lne∗k = lnek −
∑
i
ti(d)lnpi.
Until now, we have made an implicit assumption that individual total expenditures
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ek are observed. Such information, nonetheless, is barely collected, as is the case in
many household surveys and in the survey we use in this study. As a solution to this
issue, one can exploit expenditures on exclusive or assignable goods to learn about
how much each member receives from total household resources and then correct
for the resulting measurement error (Caiumi and Perali, 2015; Menon et al., 2017;
Mangiavacchi and Piccoli, 2017).
Once assignable individual expenditures are taken into account, non-assignable ex-
penditures are assumed to be shared equally by adults and children.1 Hence,
observed resource shares become σk =
ek∑
ek
k
where σ1 + σ2 = 1, so that we can
writelnek = σklne.
Returning to the awaiting correction issue of ek, a modifying functionm(z) ∈
(
0, e
ek
)
is used to correct any measurement error related to ek which leads to speciﬁcation
of the sharing rule. The arguments of this function are distribution factors z which
aﬀect the intrahousehold bargaining between adults and children but not their pref-
erences2.
This enables to deﬁne the sharing rule, which explains a shadow intrahousehold
resource allocation, as a function of individual expenditures and distribution factors,
i.e. for member 1 (adult), we have φ1(e1, z) = e1 ·m(z) which in log becomes linear
as3
lnφ1(e1, z) = lne1 + lnm(z) = σ1lne+ lnm(z).
Since by deﬁnition lne = lnφ1 + lnφ2 = lne1 + lne2, we have the sharing rule for
member 2 (child) equal to
lnφ2(e2, z) = lne− lnφ1 = σ2lne− lnm(z).
The functional form of the scaling function m(z) is assumed to be of Cobb-Douglas
1Chavas et al. (2017) test the innocence of such an assumption; they show that assuming a fair
distribution of non-assignable goods among family members does not aﬀect parameter estimates
of the sharing rule (see their Proposition 5 and Appendix B).
2Note that the scaling function does not depend on expenditures, a separability property in line
with the theoretical properties of independence of income of the sharing rule by Dunbar et al.
(2013) and Chavas et al. (2017) and the empirical validation by ?.
3Since φk should not exhaust all household total expenditures e, i.e. φk < e, the m-function is
restricted to stay between 0 and eek .
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type for empirical purposes.
To take into account the endogeneity of total expenditure, we employ a control
function procedure which uses as regressors the residuals of an auxiliary regression
of total expenditure on a set of socio-demographic variables and our instruments
into the demand system model (Dauphin et al., 2011; Mukasa, 2015; Mangiavacchi
et al., 2018). The procedure is executed in two steps: the log of total expenditure
lne is ﬁrst estimated using OLS on a vector η of socio-demographic variables and
instruments as lne = η.δ+ υ and then the residual υ̂ = lne− η.δ enters the demand
system estimation. This gives the ﬁnal CQUAIDS model in budget shares to be
estimated as
wi = αi + ti(d) +
∑
j
γijlnpj + β
1
i [lnφ
∗
1 − lnA1(p)] + λ1i
[lnφ∗1 − lnA1(p)]2
B1(p)
+β2i [lnφ
∗
2 − lnA2(p)] + λ2i
[lnφ∗2 − lnA2(p)]2
B2(p)
+ ρiυ̂ + ξi
where lnφ∗1 = σ1lne+ lnm(z)−
∑
i
ti(d)lnpi and lnφ
∗
2 = σ2lne− lnm(z)−
∑
i
ti(d)lnpi.
Note that ρi captures any endogeneity of total expenditure. ξi is the error term.
The system is estimated using feasible generalized nonlinear least squares method
and imposing the QUAIDS standard regulatory conditions: adding-up (
∑
i
αi = 1),
homogeneity (
∑
i
γij =
∑
j
γij = 0,
∑
i
τir = 0 and
∑
i
βki =
∑
i
λki = 0 for
each k = 1, 2) and symmetry (γij = γji, ∀i 6= j). However, based on the evidence
that Engel curves are linear in income, we use a linear version of the model so that
the two quadratic parameters, λ1i and λ
2
i , are not estimated.
A.3. Aggregation of multidimensional deprivation
indices and decomposition
We adopt the procedures of Alkire and Foster (2009, 2011) for computing relevant
poverty indices and undertaking sub-group decomposition. These are shown below.
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Deprivation headcount ratios (hj)
The single raw deprivation rates or headcount ratios (hj) in each indicator j are
computed as
hj =
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(0,1)(yji ≤ zj)
where 1
N
N∑
i=1
I(0,1)(yji ≤ zj) is an indicator function taking 1 if the expression in
parenthesis is satisﬁed and 0 otherwise, yji is child attainment living in household i
in indicator j, zj is the cut-oﬀ in indicator j, also called indicator-speciﬁc poverty
line, and N is the number of children. Note that these raw deprivations provide
the proportion of children who are poor in a speciﬁc indicator only, regardless of
whether they are deemed multidimensionally-deprived, i.e., they are not censored
by multidimensional deprivation status (Apablaza and Yalonetzky, 2012).
Weighted deprivation count (C)
The sum of weighted deprivations (C) for each child i, also called deprivation count,
is
C =
D∑
j=1
wjI(0,1)(yji ≤ zj)
where wj is the weight given to indicator j, and D is the total number of indicators.
Multidimensional deprivation headcount rate (H)
Now, censoring at a given number of Ci (taking into account multiple deprivations)
helps ﬁnd the multidimensional deprivation headcount ratio (H) as
H =
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(0,1)(Ci ≥ k)
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where k is the multidimensional deprivation cut-oﬀ or poverty line.
Average intensity of deprivations among the poor (A)
Also important is the average intensity of deprivations (A) (number of deprivations
as a proportion of the maximum number of possible deprivations) suﬀered by the
multidimensionally-deprived children, deﬁned as
A =
1
N ·D · hj
N∑
i=1
I(0,1)(Ci ≥ k) · Ci.
Adjusted multidimensional deprivation index (M)
The adjusted multidimensional deprivation index (M) is simply given by the product
M = H · A.
Decomposition of M by dimensions and population sub-groups
The percentage contribution (Qj) of indicator j to the overall multidimensional
deprivation index (M) is calculated using
Qj =
1
N ·D ·M
N∑
i=1
I(0,1)(yji ≤ zj) · I(0,1)(Ci ≥ k)
where the terms on the right hand side are as deﬁned previously. Lastly, the contri-
bution of a population sub-group s (e.g. rural) to the overall child multidimensional
deprivation index is extracted from the identity
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M1(
N1
N
)
M
+
M2(
N2
N
)
M
+ ...+
Ms(
Ns
N
)
M
= 1
whereNs is the number of households with children in each sub-group s = 1, 2, . . . , S.
Each element at the left hand side of the equation is, therefore, the contribution of
a speciﬁc sub-group.
A.4. Dimensions, indicators and aggregation of child
multidimensional deprivation
Dimensions and indicators
Identification and aggregation
We adopt the procedures of Alkire and Foster (2009, 2011) to identify a child as
multidimensional deprived and to aggregate into an index. The sum of weighted
deprivations (C) for each child i, also called deprivation count, is
C =
D∑
j=1
wjI(0,1)(yji ≤ zj)
where wj is the weight given to indicator j, and D is the total number of indicators.
We then identify a child as multidimensionally-deprived if she is deprived in at least
33% of the weighted deprivations, i.e., Ci ≥ 0.33.
For aggregation, censoring at a given number of Ci (taking into account multiple
deprivations) helps ﬁnd the multidimensional deprivation headcount ratio (H) as
H =
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(0,1)(Ci ≥ k)
where k is the multidimensional deprivation cut-oﬀ, 0.33 in our case.
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Figure A.3.: Concentration curves for child stunting ranked by child expenditure
Note: All estimates are weighted to make them representative of the corresponding population. All curves consider
95% conﬁdence intervals (not shown).
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Figure A.4.: Concentration curves for child multidimensional deprivation ranked
by child expenditure
Note: Multidimensional deprivations status here is based on non-monetary dimensions and a cut-oﬀ at k = 0.33.
All estimates are weighted to make them representative of the corresponding population. All curves consider 95%
conﬁdence intervals (not shown).
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Table A.5.: Correlates of children's monetary poverty, stunting and multidimen-
sional deprivation
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Table A.6.: Dimensions, indicators, weights and deprivation thresholds of child
multidimensional deprivation
Dimension (weight) Indicator (weight)* Deprived if
D1. Child education (1/3)* D11. Child enrollment (1/6) A school-age child is not currently attending
school.
D12. Child formal education (1/6) A school-age child has no formal education.
D2. Child health and
nutrition (1/3)
D21. Child mortality (1/9) Any child died over the past 2 years.
D22. Child sickness (1/9) Child faced serious illness since two months.
D23. Child stunting (1/9) Child (under 7-old) is stunted (height-for-age
z-score < -2) (WHO).
D3. Living standards (1/3)
...child lives in a household with...
D31. Safe water (1/18) Unsafe source of drinking water (WHO).
D32. Sanitation (1/18) Unimproved toilet facility (WHO).
D33. Electricity (1/18) No access to electricity.
D34. Cooking fuel (1/18) No improved cooking fuel (dung, wood or
charcoal).
D35. Floor (1/18) Floor made of natural, non-permanent material.
D36. Information (1/18) No TV/ radio/ mobile phone/ ﬁxed phone.
Notes: *For the under-7 children sample, the two indicators of the child education dimension is proxied by an indicator that a child's
biological mother is illiterate.
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Table A.7.: Balancing test on diﬀerences between PW treated and control house-
holds in mean of observed variables before and after matching
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Table A.8.: Impacts of PSNP & allied programs on children's resources and well-
being: PSM methods
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